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Federal law is enforced through a combination of public and private efforts. Com-
mentary on the choice between public and private enforcement has generated a
remarkably stable set of arguments about the strengths and weaknesses of each
type. But the conventional wisdom tells only part of the story, as it ignores varia-
tions within the category of public enforcement. Many federal statutes authorize
civil enforcement by both a federal agency and the states. State enforcement is dif-
ferent from federal enforcement in several important respects, representing a unique
model of public enforcement. The authority to enforce federal law is also a unique
form of state power. As I show, enforcement authority can serve as a potent means
of state influence by enabling states to adjust the intensity of enforcement and to
press their own interpretations of federal law. To date, enforcement has been
neglected in the federalism literature, which tends to equate state power with state
regulation. But enforcement authority may exist outside of regulatory authority,
allowing states to operate even in areas where state law is preempted or state regula-
tors have chosen not to act. And enforcement empowers a distinct breed of state
representatives-elected, generalist attorneys general. Just as state attorneys general
differ from federal agencies as agents of enforcement, they differ from state agen-
cies as agents of federal-state interaction. Moreover, attorneys general in most states
are independent from the state legislature and governor, and may represent dif-
ferent constituencies. Enforcement authority therefore opens up new outlets for
state-centered policy, empowering actors whose interests and incentives distinguish
them from the state institutions that dominate other channels of federal-state
dialogue.
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INTRODUCTION
The law in books is different from the law in action.1 Enforce-
ment determines the distance between the two. Studies show that only
a fraction of people with litigable grievances sue.2 Federal agencies go
after an even smaller proportion of offenders. 3 If that changed over-
night, and every arguable violation resulted in some form of enforce-
ment action, the law as we know it would mean something very
different. The words that appear in statutes and in judicial decisions
would be the same, but their practical effect would be transformed by
the shift in enforcement practices.
1 See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12 (1910),
reprinted in AMERicAN LEGAL REALISM 39, 39-40 (William W. Fischer III, Morton J.
Horwitz, & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993).
2 See David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 377
(1998) ("[A]part from automobile-related injuries, Americans are extremely reluctant to
sue. A large ICJ study found that claims were made in 44% of motor vehicle injuries, 7%
of work-related injuries, and 3% of other injuries-all in all, in about one accidental injury
in ten."); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 136 (2002) (discussing results of survey of more than five thousand
households and reporting that "even for ... substantial grievances, litigation is by no
means a knee-jerk or common reaction in America, as overall only about 5% of the
survey's grievances ultimately resulted in a court filing").
3 For example, in the 1990s the audit rate for individual tax returns was 1.7 percent
and the probability of arrest for drunk driving was about 0.003. A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 45,
71 n.77 (2000) (citing James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. Lrr. 818, 820
(1998), and Donald S. Kenkel, Do Drunk Drivers Pay Their Way? A Note on Optimal
Penalties for Drunk Driving, 12 J. HEALTH ECON. 137, 145 (1993)).
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If enforcement controls the effective meaning of the law, it mat-
ters a great deal who controls enforcement. Virtually all federal civil
statutes vest enforcement authority in a federal agency; some also
create private rights of action that permit private parties to sue to
enforce federal law. Decades of commentary on the choice between
public and private enforcement has generated a remarkably stable set
of arguments about the strengths and weaknesses of each type.4 But
the conventional wisdom tells only part of the story, as it ignores vari-
ations within the category of public enforcement.
In fact, there are two types of public enforcement. Many federal
statutes authorize civil enforcement by both a federal agency and the
states, typically through states' attorneys general. 5 State enforcement
provisions appear most frequently in federal laws designed to protect
4 See infra Part I.A.
5 See infra Part I.B (discussing state enforcement of federal law). This Article focuses
on direct state enforcement of federal civil law. States may participate in various ways in
the enforcement of federal criminal law as well, for example by arresting individuals for
federal offenses. But states lack power to enforce federal criminal law directly, such as by
prosecuting federal offenders themselves in state or federal court. States play a similar role
with respect to federal immigration law. Under Section 287(g) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act, states or localities can sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the
federal government to deputize officials to enforce federal immigration law "in relation to
the investigation, apprehension, or detention of [noncitizens] in the United States." 8
U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). Deputized state officials obtain federal training from the federal
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) and work under ICE's supervision.
See Jennifer M. Chacon, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudica-
tion of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DuKE L.J. 1563, 1582-86 (2010) (discussing
Section 287(g) arrangements). States also contribute to the criminal enforcement of immi-
gration law by investigating and arresting offenders, though again they lack the authority
to prosecute offenders directly. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2006) (authorizing state and local law
enforcement officials to arrest and detain certain illegal aliens "for such period of time as
may be required for the [ICE] to take the individual into Federal custody for purposes of
deporting or removing the alien from the United States"); United States v. Santana-
Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing implicit authority for state
police to detain suspects for federal immigration violations); Gonzales v. City of Peoria,
722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that state and local police may arrest suspects
for violations of criminal, but not civil, provisions of federal immigration law). The current
controversy regarding Arizona's immigration laws concerns efforts by the state to increase
its role in implementing federal immigration rules in ways that are not authorized by fed-
eral statute. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009)
(rejecting preemption challenge to Arizona law that authorizes attorney general to sue
employers who hire illegal aliens in violation of federal law), cert. granted sub nom.
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010); United States v.
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (enjoining portions of Arizona law author-
izing police officers to check individuals' federal immigration status and to arrest individ-
uals where there is probable cause to believe that they committed offenses that make them
removable from United States). As such, they are distinct from the questions explored
here, which involve state enforcement of federal law pursuant to explicit congressional
authorization.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 86:698
STATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAW
consumers, such as the recent Dodd-Frank financial overhaul bill.6
Proponents of state enforcement emphasize its potential to buttress
federal efforts by putting more "cops on the beat."' 7 But state enforce-
ment does not just intensify public enforcement of federal law, it
changes it. State and federal enforcement serve different principals
and empower different agents. The first distinction should be obvious:
The public interest promoted by state enforcement is the interest of
the state and its citizens, while federal enforcement purports to serve
the broader national interest. More subtle, but no less significant, are
the differences between the agents who control the exercise of
enforcement authority at each level. Elected, generalist state attor-
neys general8 share little in common with the appointed, specialist
agency officials who are the typical agents of federal enforcement. The
result is a brand of public enforcement that differs markedly from the
more familiar federal model.
Despite its prevalence, we lack an account of state enforcement
of federal law-what it is and how it affects citizens, states, and the
federal system.9 This Article seeks to fill those gaps, exposing state
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1042, 124 Stat. 1376, 2012-14 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552).
7 See 153 CONG. REc. S15,990 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of Sen. Mark
Pryor) (arguing that Consumer Product Safety Improvements Act (CPSIA) "ensures that
[state attorneys general] can act as real cops on the beat, looking out for consumers and
restoring confidence in the marketplace").
8 Forty-three states provide for popular election of the attorney general. In the
remaining states, the attorney general is appointed: in Maine, by the legislature; in
Tennessee, by the state Supreme Court; and in five states (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, Wyoming), by the governor. Only two states-Alaska and Wyoming-
permit the governor to remove the attorney general at will. William P. Marshall, Break Up
the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Execu-
tive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006).
9 Some scholars have analyzed state enforcement of federal law in a specific legal con-
text, most notably antitrust. For critiques of state antitrust enforcement, see, for example,
Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism? Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General, 72
U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (2005), and Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of
Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLIcr: ANTI-
TRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL EcONoMy 252, 252-66 (Richard A. Epstein &
Michael S. Greve eds., 2004). For defenses, see Stephen Calkins, Perspectives on State and
Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673 (2003), Carole R. Doris, Another View on
State Antitrust Enforcement-A Reply to Judge Posner, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 345 (2001),
Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1004 (2001), and Ronald L. Hubbard & James Yoon, How the Antitrust
Modernization Commission Should View State Antitrust Enforcement, 17 Loy. CONSUMER
L. REV. 497 (2005). As I explain below, antitrust is an extreme and unusual case for state
enforcement. See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text (distinguishing antitrust as
unique among areas of state enforcement). It would be a mistake, therefore, to generalize
from the antitrust context to the many other areas in which states enforce federal law.
Scholars have begun to focus their attention on other specific instances of state enforce-
ment outside the antitrust context. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer
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enforcement as both a unique model of public enforcement and a
unique form of state power. Enforcement has been neglected in the
federalism literature to date, which equates state power with state
law.10 As I show, however, enforcement authority can serve as a
potent means of state influence by enabling states to adjust the inten-
sity of enforcement and to press their own interpretations of federal
law.
Although enforcement authority usually follows from regulatory
authority, state enforcement of federal law disrupts that pattern, by
empowering state enforcers even in areas where state law is pre-
empted or where state regulators have chosen not to act. Enforcement
also employs a distinct set of state representatives. Just as state attor-
neys general differ from federal agencies as agents of enforcement,
they differ from other state actors as agents of federal-state interac-
tion. Unlike the specialist state agencies that administer cooperative
federalism schemes, attorneys general have broad jurisdictions as well
as political incentives to challenge federal orthodoxy. And attorneys
general in most states are independent from the state legislature and
governor, representing different constituencies. Enforcement
authority therefore opens up new outlets for state-centered policy,
empowering actors whose interests and incentives distinguish them
from the state institutions that dominate other channels of federal-
state dialogue.
This analysis has important implications for current debates. First,
attention to state enforcement reveals the limitations of the standard
discourse on models of enforcement. State enforcement blurs the lines
between public and private enforcement, drawing features from both
categories. The hybrid nature of state enforcement makes it a valuable
tool in areas where policy makers are concerned about the possibility
of overenforcement yet are reluctant to rely exclusively on a federal
agency. Like private enforcement, state enforcement offers a hedge
against the possibility that federal agencies will abdicate on enforce-
ment due to capture, bureaucratic pathologies, political influence, or
Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173
(2010) (critiquing state enforcement of state and federal securities law); Amy Widman,
Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State
Enforcement Powers-A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act
of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 165 (2011) (praising state enforcement of CPSIA).
10 See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (noting authors' emphasis on state reg-
ulatory authority in federalism context). Amy Widman's study of state enforcement of the
CPSIA is an important exception. See Widman, supra note 9, at 177-78 (identifying state
enforcement of federal law as valuable form of "uncooperative federalism" in areas where
law is underenforced by federal agencies (quoting Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K.
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1259 (2009))).
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resource limitations. But unlike private enforcement, state enforce-
ment has built-in safeguards that reduce the risk of overenforcement.
State enforcers are limited in number and must ration their own
scarce resources. Existing institutional arrangements further dis-
courage state-federal conflict and overenforcement by states by pro-
moting consultation and cooperation between state enforcers and
their federal counterparts. Thus, state enforcement can serve as a
compromise between broad private rights of action and a federal
monopoly on enforcement.
State enforcement of federal law also holds new lessons for feder-
alism. Federalism scholars tend to see preemptive federal law as the
end of the battle over states' rights." That view is mistaken. While
preemption prevents states from making and enforcing their own
laws, it need not extinguish all state authority. On the contrary, states
can continue to exert influence through enforcement of federal law.
Such state enforcement is capable of generating many of the
democratic and epistemic benefits commonly associated with state
regulatory authority. Decentralization is not an unqualified good, as
state-level variation in enforcement (as in regulation) can produce
inefficient and undesirable policy outcomes. But state enforcement
and state regulation generate different costs and benefits for the fed-
eral system; as a result, state enforcement power is appropriate even
in some areas where state law is properly preempted. State enforce-
ment of federal law, moreover, is not a one-size-fits-all proposition.
Congress can calibrate state enforcement through procedural mecha-
nisms that reduce the risks of disuniformity and overenforcement,
while still promoting the values of federalism.
This Article unfolds in three parts. Part I surveys the literature on
public and private enforcement of federal law and then introduces
state enforcement as a third option. Part II explores the distinctive
features of state enforcement authority that differentiate it both from
federal enforcement and from other types of state authority. Part III
takes up the question whether this unique form of state power is valu-
able from a federalism perspective, isolating the conditions that
11 Some scholars have argued that the anti-commandeering doctrine-which prohibits
the federal government from compelling states to participate in the implementation of fed-
eral law-should be abandoned if the alternative is preemption. See Neil S. Siegel, Com-
mandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1629, 1635
(2006) ("[C]ommandeering should be held constitutional as far as the Tenth Amendment is
concerned when preemption constitutes a feasible alternative in the short run and such
preemption would reduce state regulatory control relative to the commandeering at issue,
the federal mandate is fully funded or relatively inexpensive to carry out, and the federal
government takes effective measures to maintain lines of accountability .... ").
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render state enforcement of federal law more or less desirable. A brief
conclusion follows.
I
THREE CATEGORIES OF ENFORCEMENT
A. Public and Private Enforcement
The academic literature on enforcement authority recognizes two
categories of enforcement: public enforcement-defined as "the use
of public agents .. . to detect and to sanction violators of legal
rules"12-and private enforcement by nongovernmental individuals
and groups. Most of the commentary analyzes enforcement from an
economic perspective. 13 Viewed through that lens, the central goal of
any system of law enforcement is to promote the right level of deter-
rence as efficiently as possible.' 4 A large part of that task is identifying
the most suitable enforcer or combination of enforcers, which in turn
demands an inquiry into the interests, incentives, and capabilities of
both public and private actors.
The conventional account of public enforcement emphasizes its
capacity to translate broad legal commands into sensible operating
rules that promote the optimal level of deterrence. First, public
enforcement can be "monopolistic" in the sense that decision making
is centralized in a single body.' 5 Some degree of centralization is nec-
essary to ensure that enforcement, in all of its forms, conforms to a
stable set of principles. Second, public enforcers have no inherent
incentive to maximize enforcement by taking action on every color-
able offense.' 6 The salaries of government lawyers and other officials
are not usually tied to the number of enforcement actions they under-
12 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 45.
13 For a sampling, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 631-46 (6th ed. 2003), STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 389-539 (2004), Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,
and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974), William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975), A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980),
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, and Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence
Between the Private and the Social Motive To Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575
(1997) [hereinafter Shavell, Fundamental Divergence].
14 See Shavell, Fundamental Divergence, supra note 13, at 581 ("[T]he social objective
is simply minimization of the sum of social costs: the harm from injury to victims, plus the
costs of precautions, plus the costs associated with use of the legal system-these com-
prising victims', injurers', and the state's legal costs.").
15 See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 39 ("The existence of a public monopoly of
enforcement in a particular area of the law is a necessary ... condition of discretionary
non-enforcement.").
16 See id. at 15 (emphasizing that "public enforcer[s are] not constrained to act as...
private profit maximizer[s]").
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take. And while public enforcers may be rewarded in various ways for
successful enforcement, "good" enforcement is not the same thing as
maximum enforcement. Given expansive liability rules and limited
resources, uncompromising enforcement will rarely be the path to suc-
cess for a public official. 17 Third, public enforcers are charged with
representing the public interest, which in the case of federal enforce-
ment agencies means the interests of the nation as a whole. That
broad perspective allows public enforcers to take into account the full
range of costs and benefits from enforcement, including the expense
of litigation for all involved and the risk of discouraging valuable
conduct.
Although public enforcement is capable of promoting optimal
deterrence, various factors can skew it away from the public interest.
Limited resources may prevent public enforcers from uncovering and
pursuing violations. 18 Politicians may drive down public enforcement
efforts by slashing budgets or replacing agency personnel. 19 Public
enforcers may take bribes20 or may be captured by the targets of the
law.2' Government attorneys' individual interests may lead them to
shy away from difficult or controversial cases and focus instead on
low-stakes enforcement with relatively little public payoff.22 Alterna-
17 The same is often true even when liability rules are carefully specified. Imagine a
police chief who institutes a zero-tolerance policy toward all traffic infractions, so that
every violation results in a ticket. Such a move is unlikely to be a career builder.
18 See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1214 (1982) ("Public enforcement is ...frequently inadequate
because of budget constraints ....").
19 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 67 (1975) ("[Wihen the budget is determined by
the political process, there is no reason to believe that the rate of enforcement would be
economically optimal."); see also Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation
Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule
JOb-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1341 (2008) (arguing that SEC "is subject to political
whims (particularly with respect to its budget)"); infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text
(discussing political control of federal agencies).
20 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 73 ("[E]nforcement agents may be cor-
rupted: they may accept bribes, or demand payments, in exchange for not reporting viola-
tions."); see also Posner, supra note 13, at 633 (explaining that public enforcement may
encourage corruption because enforcer gains less than offender pays, which incentivizes
private transfer payments).
21 See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1073, 1089-92 (2005) (discussing problem of capture at SEC). For an overview of the
capture literature, see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1284-92 (2006).
22 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsi-
bility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1115-18 (1995) (discussing risk
that government attorneys will act contrary to agency interests for purposes of "career-
building"); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of
Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1998) ("[O]n average, the gov-
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tively, public enforcers may take an unduly aggressive approach to
enforcement in certain contexts, engaging in predatory prosecutorial
tactics 23 or overreacting to well-publicized scandals.2 4
Private enforcement offers policy makers a different set of trade-
offs. By disrupting the public monopoly on enforcement, private
enforcement may undermine any centralized enforcement strategy. 25
Private parties seek to advance their own private interests, ignoring
costs and benefits to others. The result is often either more or less
enforcement than is socially desirable.2 6 Especially when the benefits
of enforcement are high-for example, where multiple or punitive
damages are available-private enforcement is prone to over-deter.
27
On the other hand, when litigation will have a valuable deterrent
effect but offer little reward to plaintiffs, private enforcement may
lead to under-deterrence.
Despite these drawbacks, private enforcement has some valuable
features. One is compensatory: Allowing injured parties to sue
offenders directly provides a means for victims to recover from viola-
tors.28 Where deterrence is the primary goal, private enforcement can
offer a critical supplement to public efforts, particularly in areas where
overenforcement is less of a concern.29 Private parties' profit motives
create built-in incentives to enforce-incentives that public enforcers
ernment seeks and obtains less monetary relief for plaintiffs than does the private bar and
fails to address cutting edge issues, choosing instead to concentrate its efforts on small,
routine [civil rights] cases."); cf Posner, supra note 13, at 637-38 (explaining that agencies
will prefer to pursue cases that are "relatively unimportant to the defendant" and therefore
cheaper and easier to win).
23 See Aron Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of
Class Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 69, 106-07 (2004) (identifying predatory prose-
cution as potential risk of public enforcement).
24 See Pritchard, supra note 21, at 1076 (identifying "cyclical pattern of neglect and
hysterical overreaction that typifies ... regulation" in Congress and at SEC).
25 See William E. Kovacic, Private Monitoring and Antitrust Enforcement: Paying Infor-
mants To Reveal Cartels, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 766, 781 (2001) ("Robust private partici-
pation, especially independent rights of action that eliminate a public prosecutorial
monopoly, reduce or eliminate the ability of government enforcement officials to use
prosecutorial discretion as a nonlegislative tool for altering the law.").
26 See generally Shavell, Fundamental Divergence, supra note 13 (arguing that level of
litigation can be sub- or supra-optimal because private parties do not account for cost of
legal fees to others nor external deterrence benefit from suits).
27 See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 15 (describing this so-called "overenforce-
ment theorem").
28 See Shavell, Fundamental Divergence, supra note 13, at 594 (acknowledging compen-
sation as one goal of private enforcement, but arguing that social insurance system is more
efficient mode of distribution).
29 See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 31-32 (explaining that in areas such as "tort,
contract, property, and commercial law," private enforcement is less likely to overdeter
because of high probability of apprehension for violators, and because penalties tend to
equal harm caused by violations plus cost of enforcement).
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may lack. 30 Private parties also may have ready access to informa-
tion-for example, knowledge of who harmed them-that would be
more costly for public enforcers to uncover.31 And the decentralized
nature of private enforcement operates as a failsafe mechanism by
reducing the risk that entire classes of violations will go unremedied.
Precisely because private enforcers tend to be a diverse and disorga-
nized group, they cannot be captured by industry or controlled by
politicians.
Thus, neither public nor private enforcement is perfect in every
circumstance: Each can result in under- or overenforcement
depending on a variety of contextual factors. Moreover, neither cate-
gory of enforcement can be assessed in a vacuum. Policy makers can
shape enforcement through legal rules that exploit-and perhaps
adjust-the distinct incentives and abilities of public and private
enforcers. For example, private enforcement may be encouraged or
discouraged by raising or lowering the available recovery for plain-
tiffs, 32 and political control over public enforcement may be enhanced
or diminished by vesting authority in independent or executive agen-
cies.33 Commentators have long debated how to design such legal
interventions in order to achieve the most efficient results. Behind the
debates, however, lies broad consensus about the basic tendencies of
public and private enforcement.
B. State Enforcement
The conventional account outlined above pits centralized public
enforcement against the individualistic efforts of private plaintiffs. But
matters are more complicated than that. The image of "public"
enforcement reflected in the literature is not just public-it is federal.
Public enforcement assumes a different shape at the state level,
mixing in features typically associated with private enforcement and
others that do not fit neatly into either of the familiar models. State
enforcement is worthy of independent study regardless of whether the
law at issue is state or federal. But the unique attributes of state
30 See Becker & Stigler, supra note 13, at 13 (explaining that "widespread reliance on
victim enforcement" of public statutes works because private enforcers are motivated by
promise of financial rewards).
31 See SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 578-79 ("Suppose that victims or potential victims of
harm from dangerous acts, or perhaps other parties, can identify the violators with little or
no effort. Then a private role in law enforcement is apparently desirable, for it is advanta-
geous for society to harness this information that private parties have rather than to spend
resources on public enforcement to uncover violations.").
32 Id. at 590-91.
33 See generally Pritchard, supra note 21 (comparing political accountability of indepen-
dent agency with that of executive agency in context of SEC).
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enforcement-and their ramifications for federalism-are particularly
striking when state and federal actors share authority to enforce the
same federal laws.
States have no inherent power to enforce federal statutory law.34
As is true of private parties, 35 states' authority to sue under any given
statute is a dependent on congressional intent.36 Many federal civil
statutes explicitly provide for state enforcement. Those statutes single
out the state attorney general as the primary agent of state enforce-
ment and empower him or her to bring a civil action to obtain speci-
fied remedies. Notably, most state-enforcement provisions specify that
state attorneys general must sue in federal court,37 thereby departing
from the default presumption that state courts retain concurrent juris-
diction over federal causes of action.38 Most provisions also require
state enforcers to notify the relevant federal agency in advance of
filing a complaint, permit the federal agency to intervene in the case,
and restrict states from suing on violations that are the subject of a
pending federal enforcement action. 39
Express provisions for state enforcement appear largely-though
not exclusively 40-in the field of consumer protection. For example,
state attorneys general may sue to bring about compliance with fed-
eral standards regarding flammable fabrics, 41 hazardous substances, 42
34 I express no view on states' authority to sue to vindicate constitutional interests in
federal court absent statutory authorization. Cf Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 317
(3d Cir. 1981) (citing cases permitting states to bring parens patriae actions in federal court
to enforce Fourteenth Amendment).
35 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (emphasizing that
Congress must make choice whether to create private right of action).
36 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263-64 (1972) (insisting on "clear
expression of a congressional purpose" before state may sue as parens patriae to "recover
damages for injury to its general economy" under Section 4 of Clayton Act); Connecticut
v. Health Net, Inc., 383 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that states may sue
as parens patriae to enforce federal law only if there is evidence that Congress "intended
that the states be able to bring actions in that capacity"); Connecticut v. Physicians Health
Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2002) ("When determining whether a state
has parens patriae standing under a federal statute, we ask if Congress intended to allow
for such standing.").
37 See infra notes 40-55 (providing examples of such statutes).
38 See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-60 (1990) (noting that state courts are
"presumptively competent[ ] to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United
States" and "have concurrent jurisdiction where it is not excluded by express provision, or
by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
39 See infra notes 41-54 (providing examples of such statutes).
40 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(3) (2006) (authorizing states to sue in federal court to
enforce federal rules regarding access to abortion clinics).
41 15 U.S.C. § 1194(a) (2006). The statute authorizes states to sue for injunctive relief,
subject to the procedural requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 2073. Section 2073 provides that the
attorney general or other authorized officer of a state may bring an action in federal court
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packaging of household substances, 43 and consumer products. 44 Other
federal consumer protection statutes allow states to sue as parens
patriae45 to obtain either damages or injunctive relief on behalf of
their residents for violations of rules governing credit repair organiza-
tions, 46  credit reporting agencies, 47  pay-per-call services, 48
telemarketers, 49 professional boxing matches,50 sports agents,51 chil-
dren's online privacy protection,52 e-mail spam,53 and the delivery and
to obtain appropriate injunctive relief and must provide written notice to the Consumer
Protect Safety Commission at least 30 days before the initiation of such an action. 15
U.S.C. § 2073(b)(2)(A) (Supp. II 2009). State enforcement is precluded if, at the time the
suit is brought, the same alleged violation is the subject of a pending civil or criminal action
by the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 2073(b)(5). The same limitations apply to private actions.
Id. § 2073(a).
42 15 U.S.C. § 1264(d) (2006) (incorporating procedural requirements of 15 U.S.C.
§ 2073).
43 15 U.S.C. § 1477 (Supp. II 2009) (same).
44 15 U.S.C. § 2073(b)(1) (same).
45 For an overview of parens patriae actions, see Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore
Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1863-71 (2000), and Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An
Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847 (2000).
46 15 U.S.C. § 1679h(c)(1)-(4) (2006) (authorizing states to sue in any court for dam-
ages or injunctive relief; states must give prior notice to Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and cannot sue defendant for violation that is already subject of civil action by FTC).
47 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(c)(1)-(4) (2006) (authorizing states to sue in any court for injunc-
tive relief or actual or statutory damages; states must give prior notice to FTC "or the
appropriate Federal regulator" and cannot sue defendant for violation that is already sub-
ject of civil action by federal agency; FTC "or appropriate Federal regulator" may inter-
vene in any state action and will have right to be heard, to remove action to federal court,
and to file petition for appeal).
48 15 U.S.C. § 5712 (2006) (authorizing states to sue in federal court for damages or
injunctive relief; states must give prior notice to FTC and cannot sue defendant for viola-
tion that is already subject of civil action by FTC).
49 15 U.S.C. § 6103 (2006) (same); 47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(1)-(7) (2006) (authorizing states
to sue in federal court to enjoin any "pattern or practice" of unlawful telephone calls or
other transmissions to residents of state, and/or to obtain actual or statutory damages for
each violation, which may be trebled by court order; states must give prior notice to
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and cannot sue defendant for violation that
is already subject of civil action by FCC).
50 15 U.S.C. § 6309(c) (2006) (authorizing states to sue in federal court for injunctive
relief, fines, or "such other relief as the court may deem appropriate").
51 15 U.S.C. § 7804 (2006) (authorizing states to sue in federal court for damages or
injunctive relief; states must give prior notice to FTC and cannot sue defendant for viola-
tion that is already subject of civil action by FTC).
52 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)-(d) (2006) (authorizing states to sue in federal court for dam-
ages or injunctive relief; states must give prior notice to FTC and cannot sue defendant for
violation that is already subject of civil action by FTC; FTC may intervene in any state
action and will have right to be heard and to file petition for appeal).
53 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f) (2006) (authorizing states to sue in federal court for injunctive
relief or actual, statutory, or treble damages; states must give prior notice to FTC "or the
appropriate Federal regulator" and cannot sue defendant for a violation that is already
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 2011]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
transportation of household goods.54 States have similar authority to
enforce federal antitrust laws.55
Other statutes do not contain stand-alone provisions governing
state enforcement, but nevertheless authorize states to sue under
citizen-suit provisions that permit actions by interested "person[s]"
and define that term to include states. Such provisions are common in
federal environmental statutes.56 In addition, some courts have
allowed states to sue as parens patriae under federal statutes that
create broad private rights of action but are silent as to states' ability
to sue.57 Examples include the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 the
subject of civil action by federal agency; FTC "or appropriate Federal regulator" may
intervene in any state action and will have right to be heard and to file petition for appeal).
54 49 U.S.C. § 14711 (2006) (authorizing states to sue for injunctive relief in federal
court; states must give prior notice to Surface Transportation Board or Secretary of
Transportation, either of which may intervene in action and be heard on all matters and file
petitions for appeal). Section 14711(b)(4) specifies that the Secretary of Transportation
and/or the Surface Transportation Board "shall be considered to have consented to any
civil action of a State under this section if the Secretary or the Board has taken no action
with respect to the notice within 60 calendar days after the date on which the Secretary or
the Board received notice ...." The implication is that the federal enforcers have the
authority to preclude a state enforcement proceeding, although nothing in the statute says
so explicitly.
55 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2006) (authorizing states to sue in federal court to secure treble
damages for variety of violations on behalf of their citizens). States also have authority to
enforce the federal Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (2006), as well as federal
statutes governing debt relief agencies, 11 U.S.C. § 526(c)(3) (2006), online drug sales, 21
U.S.C. § 882(c) (2008), the provision of health-related services, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d)
(2009), energy-efficient products, 42 U.S.C. § 6304 (2009), and odometer tampering, 49
U.S.C. § 32709(d) (2009). States enforce the federal Securities Exchange Act in a share-
holder capacity, usually on behalf of large state pension plans. See infra note 149 and
accompanying text. The attorneys general of Oregon and Washington are authorized to sue
in any court for an injunction or other order to prevent the unlawful use of certain scenic
lands. 16 U.S.C. § 544m(b)(1)(B) (2006).
56 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §8 1532(13), 1540(g) (2006); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33
U.S.C. 88 1402(e), 1415(g) (2006); Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1502(15), 1515 (2006);
Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901(a)(8), 1910 (2006); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(12), 300j-8 (2006); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. 88 4902(2),
4911 (2006); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §8 6202(2), 6305 (2006);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(15), 6972 (2006); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7602(e), 7604 (2006); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 8302(a)(2), 8435 (2006); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9102(14),
9124 (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(21), 9659 (2006); Emergency Planning and Community Right To Know
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11046, 11049(7) (2006); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301(h), 1349(a) (2006).
57 By contrast, courts have rebuffed state efforts to sue under statutes that contain only
a narrow private right of action. For example, courts have refused to permit state suits
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) on the ground that ERISA
carefully lists the types of plaintiffs who can bring suit-participants, beneficiaries, or fidu-
ciaries of ERISA-regulated plans-but does not mention states. See Connecticut v. Health
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Fair Housing Act, 59 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.60
When a state sues as parens patriae, it acts as the representative of its
citizens. Therefore, courts have reasoned, Congress's authorization of
private suits by the citizens themselves implicitly extends to states
suing on their citizens' behalf.61
Net, Inc., 383 F.3d 1258, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2004) (denying state standing under ERISA);
Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 120-21 (2d Cir. 2002)
(same). Courts have taken a similar approach to statutes that create a cause of action for
persons "injured in [their] business or property." E.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 262-64 (1972) (insisting on "clear expression of a congressional purpose" before state
may sue as parens patriae to recover damages to its general economy under Section 4 of
Clayton Act); Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that state lacks standing to enforce Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act because, "even if the complaint did sufficiently allege an injury
to the state in its quasi-sovereign capacity, it is not clear ... that Congress, in enacting the
RICO statute, intended to permit such a parens patriae proceeding"); California v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that state may not sue on behalf of
its citizens under Section 4 of Clayton Act because "if the state is to be empowered to act
in the fashion here sought.., that authority must come not through judicial improvisation
but by legislation and rule making").
58 See, e.g., New York ex rel. Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Grp., P.C., 877 F. Supp. 143,
146-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006)).
59 See, e.g., Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 799
F. Supp. 272, 275-79 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006)).
60 See, e.g., EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 192, 196-99 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006)).
61 See, e.g., id. at 197 (citing Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., 287 F.3d at 121)
("[S]tanding provisions in many ... statutes implicitly authorize[ ] parens patriae standing
by using language that permits any 'person' who is 'aggrieved' or 'injured' to bring suit.");
see also Massachusetts v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 90, 103 (D. Mass. 1998)
(reasoning that state attorney general has statutory standing to sue under Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act as "'legal representative' of the people of the [state] for purposes
of this action" (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(a) (2006))); Minnesota v. Standard Oil Co., 568 F.
Supp. 556, 563-66 (D. Minn. 1983) (permitting state to sue as parens patriae under Section
210 of Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, which permitted suit by any "person," because
"when a state acts in its quasi-sovereign capacity in a parens patriae action, . . .[a] harm to
the individual citizens becomes an injury to the state, and the state in turn becomes the
plaintiff"). Other courts have ignored the question of congressional intent, focusing instead
on the prudential requirements for parens patriae standing-that is, that the state assert a
"quasi-sovereign interest" and allege an injury to a "sufficiently substantial segment of its
population." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982); see also New York ex rel. Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 38-40 (2d Cir.
1982) (permitting state to sue to enforce federal conspiracy statute); Support Ministries,
799 F. Supp. at 275-79 (permitting state to sue under Fair Housing Act); New York v. Peter
& John's Pump House, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 809, 811-14 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that state
may sue as parens patriae to enforce Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964). That approach
fails to distinguish between the question of parens patriae standing and the question of
statutory standing. See Health Net, Inc., 383 F.3d at 1262 (distinguishing between two types
of standing); see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 259 ("The question in this case is
not whether Hawaii may maintain its lawsuit on behalf of its citizens, but rather whether
the injury for which it seeks to recover is compensable under § 4 of the Clayton Act.");
New York ex rel. Abrams v. Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir. 1987) (reasoning that, if
state had asserted "injury to a quasi-sovereign interest of the state itself[,] ... common law
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State authority to enforce federal law is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon, though it is also rooted in older practices. 62 Many state
attorney general offices grew dramatically during the 1980s, partially
as a response to Reagan-era devolution and a decline in enforcement
by federal agencies. 63 As state attorneys general assumed new promi-
nence, provisions for state enforcement began to proliferate in
Congress. New provisions have been enacted by virtually every
Congress in the last two decades. There is no clear link between
Democratic or Republican control of Congress, or divided versus uni-
fied government, and a preference for state enforcement.
Indeed, state enforcement has been relatively uncontroversial in
Congress.64 The most common argument in its favor-usually raised
in the context of statutes that permit both state and private enforce-
ment-is a need to enhance enforcement for reasons of compensation,
deterrence, or both. As the next Part will show, one of the differences
parens patriae standing would undoubtedly exist. We would then be called on to decide
whether the RICO statute authorized recovery for that harm" (internal citations omitted)).
62 See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Les-
sons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 303-09 (1988) (discussing early state enforce-
ment of federal criminal law).
63 See Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics, and the New Federalism: State Attorneys Gen-
eral as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 538 (1994) ("During the 1980s the rate of
growth in the budget of the attorney general's office or state department of law outpaced
increases in general government spending in every single state, in some states many times
over."); Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Feder-
alism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657, 661-62 (1993) (suggesting that increased level of state
enforcement activity in antitrust and consumer protection areas was in part response to
perceived inadequacy of federal enforcement).
64 During the George H.W. Bush administration, executive officials expressed concern
with the constitutionality of direct state enforcement provisions. See S. 471, The 900 Ser-
vices Consumer Protection Act of 1991, and S. 1166, the Telephone Consumer Assistance
Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commc'ns of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 102d Cong. 16 (1991) (statement of Barry Cutler, Director, Bureau of Consumer
Protection, Federal Trade Commission) ("[D]irect state enforcement provisions may be
unconstitutional because they involve the exercise of significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States by persons not selected in accordance with the Appointments
Clause."); see also Statement on Signing the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act
of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1613 (Nov. 16, 1990) (raising concern that state attorneys general
may lack Article III standing when enforcing Federal Hazardous Substances Act and
Flammable Fabrics Act). Subsequent administrations appear to have abandoned the com-
plaint. For an analysis of the constitutional issues raised when states perform functions
within the province of the federal executive branch, see generally Evan Caminker, The
Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1075
(1997) (analyzing state administration of federal law under unitary executive theory). For
an argument that the enforcement of federal criminal law by state prosecutors may violate
the Appointments and Take Care Clauses of Article II of the Constitution, see Michael G.
Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State Courts 55-63 (Oct. 24,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-1696076.
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between state and federal public enforcement is that state attorneys
general often sue to recover damages on behalf of citizens. Like
private litigation, then, state enforcement may be driven by a desire to
compensate victims, and legislators and lobbyists sometimes invoke
that goal as a reason for empowering both states and private
parties.65 More frequently, state enforcement is justified as a means of
ensuring compliance with federal law through a "multilayered
approach to enforcement" 66 that "bring[s] more allies to [the]
fight."'67 When objections do arise, they tend to be voiced by legisla-
65 See, e.g., Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distribu-
tions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 361, 377 (1999) ("The legislative history of the [Hart-Scott-Rodino] Act demon-
strates that Congress sought to achieve three goals: (1) compensation of victims of antitrust
violations; (2) disgorgement of profits by the offenders; and (3) deterrence of future
anticompetitive actions."); see also Comprehensive Children's Product Safety Commission
Reform Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4040 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong. 94 (2007) (testi-
mony of Rachel Weintraub, Director, Product Safety and Senior Counsel, Consumer
Federation of America) (arguing that state authority to enforce federal consumer products
safety law "will be a critical tool that will help buttress the [Consumer Product Safety
Commission's] limited enforcement capabilities, help consumers to obtain redress for
harms they have suffered, and deter wrongful conduct").
66 149 CONG. REC. 25,522 (2003) (statement of Sen. John McCain) (regarding CAN-
SPAM Act of 2003).
67 153 CONG. REC. H16,882 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of Rep. Rosa
DeLauro) (regarding state enforcement under CPSIA); see also Consumer Product Safety
Commission Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer
Prot., and Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong. 65
(1989) (statement of Dr. Mark Widome, Professor of Pediatrics, Pennsylvania State
University, College of Medicine) (arguing that state enforcement of Flammable Fabrics
Act "would build a needed redundancy and failsafe provision into the [Consumer Products
Safety] Commission and help assure that some of these products get off the market");
Consumer Product Safety Commission Reauthorization (Part 2): Hearing on H. R. 3343 and
H.R. 3443 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Prot., and Competitiveness of the
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 236 (1987) (statement of U.S. Public
Research Interest Group) (regarding CPSIA, arguing that state enforcement "would mul-
tiply by fifty the number of officials available to help ensure the safety of products that are
distributed throughout the country"); 153 CONG. REc. S15,990 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007)
(statement of Sen. Mark Pryor) (arguing that CPSIA "ensures that [state attorneys gen-
eral] can act as real cops on the beat, looking out for consumers and restoring confidence
in the marketplace"); 149 CONG. REC. 25,526 (2003) (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden)
("What is going to be important is for those who are charged with enforcement-the
Federal Trade Commission, the criminal authorities,... the State attorneys general, the
Internet service providers-to bring a handful of actions very quickly to establish.., a real
deterrent .... "); id. at 25,548 (statement of Sen. Maria Cantwell) ("By allowing enforce-
ment by State attorneys general and by Internet service providers, we have increased the
odds of successful enforcement against the worst spammers."); 137 CONG. REc. 30,822
(1991) (statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings) (regarding common carrier regulation,
describing state enforcement as response to uncertainty about "[t]he will of the FCC to
enforce the bill rigorously").
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tors and industry groups who oppose the substantive project of the
statute. 68
A second recurring theme in the legislative histories of statutes
that provide for state enforcement is that states need authority to
enforce federal law because enforcement actions under state law will
be ineffective. As one attorney general, speaking on behalf of the
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG), explained to
Congress in hearings on a bill targeting pay-per-call services:
Federal court access to the States would substantially reduce the
jurisdictional difficulties and maximize the effectiveness of each
case brought by any one office. It would carry with it nationwide
service of process and also increase the ability of an attorney gen-
eral in one State to secure a defendant's assets which are located in
another State. 69
Thus, part of the appeal of state enforcement of federal law (from
the perspective of its supporters, at least) is that it facilitates states'
efforts to reach out-of-state defendants. 70
68 See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S7872 (daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Sen. Tom
Coburn) (arguing that state and private enforcement of CPSIA "provides false incentives
for overzealous attorneys general and would run precisely counter to the CPSC's policy of
carefully balancing cost and benefit in making safety regulations"); 140 CONG. REc. 10,173
(1994) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) ("Because [the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act] delegates an astonishing amount of what is in essence prosecutorial
authority to State attorneys general and to private parties ... and because it offers them
the bonanza of substantial monetary penalties, it is a virtual certainty that innocent persons
... will be targeted and pursued."); see also infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text
(discussing opposition to state enforcement of federal law due to lack of uniformity).
69 Telemarketing Fraud and Consumer Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Transp. and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong.
51 (1991) (statement of Bonnie J. Campbell, Att'y Gen. of Iowa and Vice-Chair, Consumer
Protection Committee, NAAG); see also id. at 53 (resolution of NAAG) ("[U]nder current
law, the sole means of effectively stopping a multistate fraud is for each attorney general to
file separate, and identical actions; and ... the ability of the attorneys general to proceed
against telemarketing fraud in a Federal court would eliminate the need for wasteful dupli-
cation of State resources .... ); 149 CONG. REC. 25,546 (2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy) ("Some 30 States now have antispam laws, but the globe-hopping nature of e-mail
makes these laws difficult to enforce."); id. at 25,526 (statement of Sen. Ron Wyden) ("I
believe a State-by-State approach cannot work in this area."); 139 CONG. Rc. 3907 (1993)
(statement of Rep. Allan Swift) ("State and local enforcement agencies ... have initiated
actions against fraudulent telemarketers only to be frustrated by state law jurisdictional
limits. [Fraudulent telemarketers] locate their operations outside the states in which their
victims are located or move frequently to avoid detection and prosecution under state
law.").
70 See, e.g., Mail Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Postal Operations and Servs.
of the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv., 103rd Cong. 163 (1993) (statement of
NAAG) (bemoaning "artificial constraints of jurisdictional boundaries"); 139 CONG. REC.
3910 (1993) (statement of Rep. Carlos Moorhead) (regarding Consumer Protection
Telemarketing Act, "Thousands of Californians have been victimized by... operations...
beyond the reach of our State authorities. I am therefore pleased that a major theme of
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Although states' authority to enforce federal law sometimes
operates as a supplement to enforcement of their own laws, that is not
always the case. In some cases, attorneys general are empowered to
enforce federal rules that have no state analogue, either because state
law has been preempted 7' or because the state has chosen not to legis-
late.72 It is important, therefore, to separate the question of state
enforcement from that of state regulatory authority. Typically, the two
go hand in hand: A government creates laws and then enforces them.
But state enforcement of federal law breaks that link by authorizing
state actors to enforce the law of a different sovereign. As a result,
state attorneys general may have enforcement authority in areas
where state legislatures have not acted or are powerless to act.
Similarly, state enforcement of federal law must be distinguished
from the implementation of federal objectives by states. Consider the
Clean Air Act, which instructs states to create and enforce "[s]tate
implementation plans" governing emissions from stationary sources
within the state, provided that total emissions satisfy federal stan-
dards.73 Federal standards set the floor; states may opt for more strin-
gent standards if they wish, and they retain substantial discretion in
this bill is a broad-based partnership of the Federal Trade Commission with State attorneys
general to attack telemarketing scams wherever they may be based.").
71 For examples of statutes that permit state enforcement of federal law while pre-
empting state law, see 7 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2006) (preempting some state law governing com-
modities), 11 U.S.C. § 526(d) (2006) (preempting inconsistent state law regarding debt
relief agencies), 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (2006) (preempting inconsistent state law regarding
credit transactions), 15 U.S.C. § 5722(a) (2006) (preempting inconsistent state law gov-
erning pay-per-call services), 15 U.S.C. § 6502(d) (2006) (preempting inconsistent state law
regarding children's online privacy protection), 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b) (2006) (preempting
most state law regulating sparn), and 49 U.S.C. § 32711 (2006) (preempting inconsistent
state law regarding odometer tampering).
72 See, e.g., 149 CONG. REc. 25,546 (2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (regarding
CAN-SPAM Act, noting that only thirty states have antispam laws of their own); 149
CONG. REC. 13,748 (2003) (statement of Rep. Cliff Steams) (describing provision for state
enforcement of Sports Agents Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA) and noting its ben-
efits for those states without any similar laws); 149 CONG. REc. 10,294 (2003) (statement of
Rep. Thomas Osborne) (discussing SPARTA and noting that it would provide uniform
standard, as many states did not have laws regulating sports agents); 140 CONG. REC.
17,842 (1994) (statement of Rep. John LaFalce) (noting that telemarketing fraud regulation
would authorize state attorneys general in those states without similar regulations to bring
actions in federal courts).
73 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). State implementation plans must be approved by the EPA.
Id. § 7410(a)(3), (k).
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determining how to achieve their goals.74 Other federal environmental
statutes follow a similar approach.75
The model employed by the Clean Air Act, in which states regu-
late at the direction of the federal government, is well known in the
literature on cooperative federalism. 76 Students of federalism have
emphasized the various ways that states can exercise regulatory
authority in areas of concurrent state-federal authority. For these
scholars, preserving state regulatory authority is the primary goal of
federalism.77 Although cooperative schemes like the Clean Air Act
74 See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1183, 1198 (1995) ("The authority to allocate emissions to industry gives states an
opportunity to pay a significant political role in controlling air pollution and making
related decisions about land use and economic development-an opportunity that the vast
majority of states have taken.").
75 See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal
System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement is Shared by the United States, the
States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1571 (1995) ("[E]ssentially all the modern
major environmental laws provide uniform, minimum national standards with the states
'deputized,' to a greater or lesser degree, to do the permitting and enforcing for the federal
government.").
76 See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J.
2023, 2038 n.54 (2007) ("[T]he [Clean Air Act] embodies a cooperative regulatory frame-
work under which states bear responsibility in the first instance for devising plans to ensure
that air pollutant emissions within their borders meet federal air quality standards."). For
overviews of and citations to the cooperative federalism literature, see generally Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1262-63 & nn.14-16 (2009), and Roderick M. Hills, The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 813, 815 & nn.1-2 (1998).
77 See Metzger, supra note 76, at 2026 n.4 ("[F]ederalism refer[s] primarily to pro-
tecting the ability of the states to exercise meaningful regulatory power in their own
right."); Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2008, at 93, 94 n.7 (defining "federalism" as "a constitutional
regime that aims to vindicate certain values ... by affording significant protection to the
regulatory autonomy of subnational states"); cf Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 76,
at 1259 (discussing instances of "uncooperative federalism," where "states use regulatory
power conferred by the federal government to tweak, challenge, and even dissent from
federal law"). The emphasis on regulation is also evident in the vast and ever-growing
literature on preemption. For a small sampling, see generally William W. Buzbee, Asym-
metrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1547, 1555-56 (2007) (arguing that federal floor preemption risks less regulatory failure
than unitary federal choice preemption, which precludes state and local protections and
eliminates institutional diversity), Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's
Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1933, 1937-39 (2008) (offering realist view of federal agency preemption that favors
agency regulation over Congressional action), Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption:
How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4
(2007) (arguing for presumption against federal preemption of state regulation), Nina A.
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REv. 737, 742 (2004) (arguing against
Chevron deference when agencies preempt state law), and Catherine M. Sharkey, Feder-
alism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 DuKE L.J. 2125, 2129 (2009) (pro-
posing reforms to increase state participation in agency preemption decision making).
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limit the autonomy of states in various ways, they leave important
room for interstate variation. Accordingly, while states implementing
the Clean Air Act and similar statutes certainly engage in enforce-
ment, the rules that they are enforcing may vary from state to state.
As the consumer protection and other statutes described above illus-
trate, however, enforcement authority can exist independent of regu-
latory authority. That is, even where Congress has denied states any
regulatory autonomy, it may offer them a role in enforcing federal
law.
II
STATE INFLUENCE THROUGH ENFORCEMENT
State enforcement of federal law complicates conventional
accounts of public and private enforcement by exposing gaps in pre-
vailing theories of enforcement. State enforcement is different from
federal enforcement in several significant respects. State enforcement
is largely decentralized, and states act on behalf of a set of interests
that diverge in important ways from those represented by federal
enforcers. State enforcement also empowers a different set of
agents-elected, generalist attorneys general. Differences between the
institutions in charge of enforcement at the state and federal levels
translate, in turn, into differences in enforcement outputs.
Enforcement therefore creates new channels for state-federal dia-
logue and, perhaps, discord. This Part explores state enforcement as a
form of state influence, first sketching the distinctive features of state
enforcement and then illustrating how enforcement can serve as an
instrument for state policy making.
A. State and Federal Enforcement Compared
1. Decentralized Enforcement
Public enforcement at the federal level is marked by centraliza-
tion and political control. Most federal civil statutes vest public
enforcement authority in a single federal agency.78 And all federal
agencies operate under the supervision of Congress, the President, or
both.79 The President appoints agency heads and, with the exception
78 Federal criminal enforcement may be somewhat less centralized because of the dis-
cretion vested in the ninety-three U.S. Attorneys' Offices. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV.
757, 781 (1999) (explaining how "federal prosecutorial authority is . . . famously frag-
mented"). But cf Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can
Learn from the States, 109 MIcH. L. REV. 519, 525 (2011) (discussing efforts to give Main
Justice more centralized authority over federal criminal enforcement).
79 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 448-49 (2008) (discussing various means
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of so-called independent agencies, can remove them from office at
will.80 Congress can steer agency policy making through use of over-
sight hearings 81 and informal interactions with agency decision
makers. 82 By adjusting agencies' budgets,83 moreover, the political
branches can calibrate the level of agency activity, including enforce-
ment efforts.84
Public enforcement at the state level lacks an equivalent mecha-
nism of centralized national control, thereby creating the potential for
more than fifty85 different approaches to the exercise of enforcement
of political control of agencies); B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of
Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 801, 822 (1991) (finding that
"[t]he leadership of an agency is the most frequent mechanism for changing agency
behavior").
80 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2326 (2006) ("[A] strong President
can stymie two agencies almost as easily as he can stymie one.").
81 See Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod,
20 CARDOZO L. REv. 775, 785 (1999) ("While the nature, quality, and intensity of legisla-
tive oversight vary from committee to committee, it is often used to signal congressional
preferences on agency policy issues and to extract policy commitments from agency
officials.").
82 See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 509 (1989) ("Agency action can be publicly
castigated on the House or Senate floor, and members of Congress or their staffs can
importune agency decision makers.").
83 See Haoran Lu, Presidential Influence on Independent Commissions: A Case of FTC
Staffing Levels, 28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 51, 61 (1998) (showing that "presidents do use
budget, specifically staff level, to influence independent agencies"); Terry M. Moe, Regula-
tory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. ScI. 197, 201 (1982) (dis-
cussing presidential influence over budgets through executive Office of Management and
Budget); Schuck, supra note 81, at 785 ("The appropriations process sharply constrains the
authority and discretion of agencies.").
84 See MICHAEL E. MILAKOVICH & GEORGE J. GORDON, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN
AMERICA 373 (10th ed. 2009) ("Ronald Reagan, from the very start of his presidency, used
a comprehensive assault on the national government budget as the key to his attempt to
reshape the national bureaucracy. Reagan demonstrated convincingly that the most direct
way (if not always the easiest politically) to control an agency is to cut-or increase-its
budget .... "); Hugh Davis Graham, The Politics of Clientele Capture: Civil Rights Policy
and the Reagan Administration, in REDEFINING EQUALrrY 103, 106 (Neal Devins &
Davison M. Douglas eds., 1998) (noting that Reagan administration "slowed regulatory
activity by cutting the agency budgets"). Studies show that public enforcement by federal
agencies changes with shifts in presidential and congressional politics. See, e.g., Moe, supra
note 83, at 197-98 (finding variation in enforcement efforts of National Labor Relations
Board, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange Commission based on
presidential administration in office); Selmi, supra note 22, at 1440-41 ("Since the passage
of the Civil Rights Acts in the 1960s, each shift in political party has brought significant
change in civil rights enforcement."); Wood & Waterman, supra note 79, at 823 (finding
significant executive influence on behavior of seven agencies, especially those situated
within executive departments).
85 The number of non-federal enforcers typically exceeds fifty, as it may include the
District of Columbia as well as the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern
Marina Islands, and the territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. See
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discretion. 6 As noted above, most federal statutes that provide for
state enforcement both require state attorneys general to notify the
relevant federal agency prior to filing suit and permit the federal
agency to intervene in the case.87 Such provisions enable federal
enforcers to keep tabs on the states and to present their own views
regarding enforcement to reviewing courts. But federal enforcers
cannot prevent the states from acting in ways that conflict with the
federal enforcement strategy.88
Similarly, while state enforcers can and do coordinate with their
federal counterparts and with each other, cooperation is voluntary
and tends to break down in the face of sustained disagreement. For
example, state-federal cooperation over antitrust enforcement policy
has waxed and waned in the last three decades as state and federal
approaches have come into and out of alignment.8 9 Indeed, state
enforcement tends to ramp up precisely when-and because-federal
enforcers have determined to cut back on enforcement. 90
About NAAG, Nat'l Ass'n Att'ys Gen., http://www.naag.org/about-naag.php (last visited
Apr. 20, 2011). For the sake of simplicity, this Article will focus on enforcement by the fifty
states.
86 See infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text (discussing complaints by legislators
and lobbyists that state enforcement will produce disuniformity in federal law).
87 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (prescribing procedures for
state enforcement of federal rules governing consumer products, including notice require-
ment and federal agency's right of intervention); 15 U.S.C. § 1264(d) (2006) (same, for
state enforcement of federal rules governing hazardous substances); 15 U.S.C. § 1194(a)
(2006) (providing for state enforcement of federal rules governing flammable fabrics and
incorporating procedural requirements of § 2073).
88 See Rose, supra note 9, at 2205 (explaining that when voluntary cooperation breaks
down, "the enforcer concerned about underdeterrence will always stand in a position to
thwart the efforts of the enforcer who is concerned about overdeterrence, leading to a
potentially ill-advised ratcheting up of enforcement intensity"); Widman, supra note 9, at
179 (explaining that state-enforcement provisions "allow[ ] states to enforce [federal] regu-
lations when the agency does not").
89 See STEPHEN D. HOUCK, NAT'L Ass'N OF ATr'Ys GEN., TRANSITION REPORT: THE
STATE OF STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 2-4 (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.naag.org/
transition-report-the-state-of-state-antitrust-enforcement.php (discussing state-federal
cooperation-and lack thereof-under Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush 1I
administrations).
90 See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 9, at 734 ("State perception of a lack of federal will is
the most common stimulus to expansive state activity."); Ralph H. Folsom, State Antitrust
Remedies: Lessons from the Laboratories, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 941, 954 (1990) ("The state
attorneys general committed themselves to 'filling the gap' created by Reagan administra-
tion antitrust policies by increasing their state antitrust prosecutions."); Dru Stevenson,
Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1, 39-40
(2007) ("[Olne manifestation of a presidential policy of deregulation is agency inaction on
the enforcement and rulemaking fronts. Ironically, the unintended consequence of this
policy is an increase in litigation activity by the state AG's in the very same area, which can
prove just as daunting to the regulated industry as routine oversight by a federal agency.");
Brooke A. Masters, States Flex Prosecutorial Muscle, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at Al
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Interstate coordination likewise has worked best at bringing like-
minded states together.91 States frequently work together in multistate
actions that target a single defendant or group of defendants. 92 Those
actions rarely involve all fifty states, however, and there is no central-
ized lever akin to presidential control to pull wayward states into line
with the rest. The most that can be said is that multiple enforcers are
capable of synchronization when they agree on a common goal. When
interests diverge, so too does enforcement.93
2. Local Interests, Local Knowledge
Divergent approaches to the exercise of enforcement discretion
are not just possible, they are likely. One of the core tenets of feder-
alism is that decentralized decision making will yield different results
from policy making at the national level. While the point usually per-
tains to regulatory authority, it applies with equal force to decisions
about enforcement. Rarely does the distribution of interests in one
state mirror those in other states or in the nation as a whole. Interests
("[S]tate regulators and attorneys general are bringing legal action and launching investi-
gations in ... areas where they say federal regulators have fallen down on the job. 'Our
action is the result of federal inaction,' said Connecticut Attorney General Richard
Blumenthal, who has brought actions against drug companies, polluters, and the
Environmental Protection Agency."); PETER J. BRANN, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. STATE
ATr'Y GEN. PROJECT, STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER A
NEW ADMINISTRATION: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND NEW CHALLENGES 8 (2008), http://
www.law.columbia.edu/
null?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file id=55833&rtcontentdispositi ("As the [George
W.] Bush Administration cut back on consumer protection efforts, the States have rushed
in to fill the void.").
91 Although the NAAG has adopted more than 100 policy positions in an effort to
"promote uniformity in specific areas of law[,] ... NAAG stresses that '[t]he autonomy of
each Attorney General is carefully protected .... '" Joseph F. Zimmerman, Interstate
Cooperation: The Roles of the State Attorneys General, 28 PUBLIUS 71, 75 (1998) (quoting
NAT'L ASS'N OF ATORNEYS GEN., POLICY POSITIONS 7 (1993)).
92 See generally Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of
State Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998 (2001) (dis-
cussing multistate actions).
93 See Rose, supra note 9, at 2205 ("[V]oluntary coordination can break down if dis-
agreements arise over the best enforcement approach. This is a realistic probability, even
amongst well-incentivized enforcers, given the significant empirical uncertainty that will
exist regarding the relative level of under- and overdeterrence costs."); cf HOUCK, supra
note 89, at 17 ("The main concern expressed by state [assistant attorneys general working
in the antitrust area] relates to the perceived decline in the effectiveness of multistate
working groups. There is a general perception that the multistate working groups are not
run as effectively or efficiently as they should be, and have been historically."); Judith
Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal
Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARiz. L. REv. 709, 753 (2008) (dis-
cussing disputes within NAAG and formation of subgroup called Republican Attorneys
General Association, which has taken positions different from those of NAAG on several
issues).
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with little voice on the national stage can be heard loud and clear by
state governments. And different interests wield power in different
states.
State enforcement in any given state is likely to respond to inter-
ests and concerns that would be overlooked by other states and the
federal government. In the antitrust context, for example, state
enforcers report that they "typically focus on enforcement cases that
have significant specific local or regional impact upon their states,
their consumers, and their public institutions .. . . -94 As discussed in
more detail below, elected state attorneys general have strong incen-
tives to serve their local constituencies. State enforcers also are likely
to have a better understanding of local conditions than their federal
counterparts, simply by virtue of living and working in the state rather
than in Washington, D.C.95 States may have an investigatory or
enforcement apparatus in place-a local police force, for example-
that would be costly for the federal government to replicate. And
state enforcers' relative closeness to local citizens gives them access to
information that federal enforcers may not have or lack the capacity
to address. Thus, as the supporters of state enforcement of federal
consumer protection law argued, "the attorneys general in all of the
States know, perhaps more urgently and more rapidly [than the fed-
eral Consumer Product Safety Commission], when a product is
deficient." 96
3. Political and Professional Incentives
State enforcement also is likely to diverge from public enforce-
ment at the federal level because of differences in the agents of
enforcement. The prototypical federal civil enforcer is a specialist
agency headed by political appointees. Similar agencies exist at the
94 Roundtable Conference with Enforcement Officials, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 296
(2005) (statement of Patricia Connors, Chair of NAAG's Multistate Antitrust Task Force);
see also ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTAL PUBLIC COMMENT SUB-
MIT ED BY THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF HAWAII, MAINE, AND OREGON ON STATE
MERGER ENFORCEMENT 6 (2006), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/public-studiesfr28
902/enforcementpdf/060723_suppl-state-merger-com.pdf (explaining that state merger
enforcement tends to focus on local industries, including "health care, retail gasoline, solid
waste, supermarkets, movie theaters, banking, retail pharmacy, funeral homes, department
stores, and asphalt"); Michael DeBow, State Antitrust Enforcement: Empirical Evidence
and a Modest Reform Proposal, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDIC-
TION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 267, 274 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds.,
2004) (discussing "quaint, Norman Rockwell-like quality" of state antitrust enforcement).
95 See Calkins, supra note 9, at 680 ("State attorneys general have a clear comparative
advantage in understanding local markets.").
96 154 CONG. REC. S7877 (daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kay Hutchinson)
(regarding CPSIA).
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state level. Yet when federal law authorizes enforcement by states, it
bypasses state agencies in favor of state attorneys general. Unlike
their federal equivalent, most state attorneys general are indepen-
dently elected. 97 Many have aspirations to higher office,98 usually the
governor's seat or Congress.99 And, unlike agency officials, state
attorneys general are policy generalists.
A familiar theme in commentary on state enforcement is that
state attorneys general are heavily motivated by political considera-
tions.100 Critics describe attorneys general as "ambitious politicians
more interested in making headlines than consistent, viable policy,"10'
implying that politics are the primary driver behind state enforcement
decisions. That view ignores that attorneys general are a diverse group
with diverse motivations, that government lawyers will often derive
some personal or political satisfaction from public policy improve-
ments, and that the political implications of enforcement efforts will
not always be clear in advance. 10 2 As such, the critique is almost cer-
tainly overstated. One can believe that attorneys general seek to
advance their own, selfish interests without subscribing to the notion
that state enforcement decisions can reliably be explained in purely
political terms.
Nevertheless, even states' defenders concede that "state attor-
neys general are responsive to political factors in ways that the federal
agencies are not. '10 3 Although each state's experience will be dif-
ferent, all elected attorneys general have incentives to take actions
that will respond to the interests of their constituents. 10 4 And the
97 See supra note 8 (noting few states where this is not the case).
98 See Clayton, supra note 63, at 538 ("[T]he accumulation of highly visible functions
made the office [of attorney general] increasingly attractive to a younger, better educated,
and more ambitious caliber of attorney. The new breed of attorneys general have included
[those] who used the office to project themselves into national politics.").
99 Marshall, supra note 8, at 2453 ("[T]he Office of the Attorney General has long been
seen by many of its occupants as a stepping stone to the Governor's office ...."); accord
Colin L. Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in
the New Federalism, 33 PUBLIus 37, 40 (2003) ("[O]f the 166 attorneys general who served
at least two years between 1980 and 1999, more than 70 ran for a governorship or a U.S.
Senate seat. Another 20 ran for or were appointed to a lower court seat, a federal agency
post, or another position in state government.").
100 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 9, at 257-60 (arguing that state attorneys general are
focused primarily on promoting their political careers and proposing that attorneys general
be appointed rather than elected).
101 Masters, supra note 90.
102 To be sure, some cases will have a clear political valence. But every case has two
sides, and state politics can be unpredictable. I am grateful to Jim Tierney for emphasizing
this point to me.
103 First, supra note 9, at 1036.
104 See Provost, supra note 99, at 38 ("Because they are elected in most states... and
because the office often serves as a springboard into higher political positions, state attor-
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available empirical evidence-while limited-suggests that elected
attorneys general "tend to be more aggressive while appointed ones
adhere more to the 'ministerial functionary' role of attorney
general."1 0 5
Contrast federal agency heads and attorneys, many of whom
follow a career path that leads them to the private sector after a brief
stint in government. 10 6 As others have argued, "[a]gency attorneys
who plan to go into private practice have strong incentives to 'sell out'
their agencies in order to curry favor with private-sector attorneys. ' 10 7
Such attorneys tend to avoid difficult or complicated cases, focusing
instead on developing trial experience and a winning record.10 8
Other attorneys do seek out agency jobs because of a sincere
commitment to the agency's substantive mission.109 But even those
who hope to stay in government service may have reasons to avoid
neys general have strong incentives to build up their record of political accomplishments
by helping consumers and pursuing high levels of enforcement."); Eric N. Waltenburg &
Bill Swinford, The Supreme Court as a Policy Arena: The Strategies and Tactics of State
Attorneys General, 27 POL'Y STUD. J. 242, 248 (1999) (describing state attorneys general as
"politically savvy individuals who recognize the policy 'hay' that can be made by litigation
actions").
105 Provost, supra note 99, at 53. The incentives for aggressive, entrepreneurial enforce-
ment likely are amplified for attorneys general with ambitions to higher office. Scholars
have found links between ambition to higher office and risk taking and innovation by poli-
ticians. See Rebekah Herrick & Michael K. Moore, Political Ambition's Effect on Legisla-
tive Behavior: Schlesinger's Typology Revisited and Revised, 55 J. POL. 765, 771 tbl.1 (1993)
(finding that House members with aspirations to Senate introduced more legislation, made
more speeches, and had larger staffs than those who aspired to leadership positions within
House); Provost, supra note 99, at 43 (arguing that attorneys general "with progressive
ambition are more likely to prosecute businesses to gain the attention of consumers and
voters"); David W. Rohde, Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members
of the United States House of Representatives, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 1, 16 tbl.1 (1979) (demon-
strating relationship between risk taking by House members and senatorial ambitions); see
also Hills, supra note 77, at 24 ("It is not smart politics to play it safe against an incumbent
who, almost by definition, will have greater name recognition and nonideological goodwill
106 See Selmi, supra note 22, at 1442 (noting one of several reasons attorneys choose to
work for government organizations is to obtain litigation experience marketable to private
employers).
107 Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 1117.
108 See PosNER, supra note 13, at 644 ("[L]awyers employed by an administrative
agency may prefer to bring small cases because that will enable them to get trial experience
during their brief tenure whereas a large case might not come to trial until after they had
left ....").
109 See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 29
(2000) ("[A]dministrators self-select into an employment pool consisting of individuals
who share some kind of ideological commitment to a given agency's mission .... Over
time.... those who remain with an agency are those who tend to believe in its mission and
who reap personal satisfaction from a sense that public service truly serves the public.").
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controversy and risk taking.110 The highest-ranking agency policy
makers-those in a leadership position akin to that of a state attorney
general-are unlikely to have landed in their jobs because of a long-
standing passion for the agency's project. Instead, "those rewarded by
political appointment tend to be those whose prior political loyalty
demonstrates some kind of philosophical commitment to a party's or
candidate's platform; political principles seem especially likely to
inform their understanding of their own roles and missions." ' Those
principles may weigh in favor of strong enforcement, but that result is
hardly inevitable. Political appointees often carry marching orders to
do less, not more. 12
State attorneys general also differ from federal agencies in terms
of the breadth of their jurisdiction. Research shows that elected gener-
alists are more likely than appointed policy specialists to take risks or
initiate major reforms. Professor Roderick Hills explains that
[b]ureaucrats' authority rests on their expertise, specialized training,
and experience dealing with particular interests defined by author-
izing statutes. Therefore, bureaucrats rarely try to form new interest
groups but instead broker between those groups with which they
are familiar. Bureaucrats also tend to resist or at least be indifferent
to broad policy considerations or claims of abstract justice that do
not fall squarely within their regulatory specialty .... Politicians'
authority, by contrast, springs out of their capacity to organize and
inspire voters." 3
Hills describes state and local politicians as "natural policy entre-
preneurs who can significantly influence what sorts of conditions are
publicly recognized as problems.' 14 Although his focus was regula-
tion rather than enforcement, the argument holds for state attorneys
general." 5 As the name suggests, attorneys general enjoy a broad
110 See Selmi, supra note 22, at 1444 ("For individuals who are interested in a govern-
ment career, they need to take into account which cases are most likely to advance their
careers .... [T]his often means avoiding controversy and adopting a policy of choosing safe
cases to which the government would not likely object or about which the government is
unlikely to come under political scrutiny or pressure.").
111 Croley, supra note 109, at 30.
112 See supra notes 63, 84, and 90 and accompanying text (discussing decline in federal
agency enforcement under Reagan and second Bush administrations).
113 Hills, supra note 77, at 15.
114 Id. at 21.
115 See Provost, supra note 99 (studying entrepreneurial behavior by state attorneys
general); cf. Allocation of Antitrust Enforcement Between the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment: Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n, at 14 (Oct. 26, 2005) (State-
ment of Harry First, Professor of Law, New York University School of Law), available at
govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission-hearings/pdf/Statement-First.pdf [hereinafter
First, Statement] (comparing state enforcers to "maverick firms" that "pursue divergent
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("general") jurisdiction to promote the public interest.116 Such expan-
sive authority carries with it important opportunities for agenda set-
ting, allowing attorneys general to pursue far-reaching policy
initiatives through their enforcement efforts.
Whatever the reason-be it politics, the professional setting in
which attorneys general work, the personalities of those who are
attracted to the office, or a combination of those and other factors-
there is ample evidence of aggressive, entrepreneurial state enforce-
ment. Take, for example, former New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer's groundbreaking campaign against Wall Street. Spitzer dusted
off a "long-dormant" state statute' 17 that "had been used in the past
to pursue boiler-room operations and Ponzi schemes."" 8 With it, he
launched a wide-ranging investigation into the relationship between
investment banks and stock analysts. Spitzer began by subpoenaing e-
mail from Merrill Lynch. When he discovered "smoking-gun" evi-
dence that the bank's analysts were using stock recommendations to
attract investment-banking business rather than to educate inves-
tors, 1 9 he publicized his findings at a press conference and accused
Merrill's research analysts of "an outrageous betrayal of. .. trust and
a shocking abuse of the system.' 120 Soon after, "Harvey Pitt, the
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and a stout
believer in industry self-regulation, announced that he had changed
his mind and ordered an investigation of his own.'' For its part,
Merrill agreed to pay a $100 million fine, to apologize, and to change
the way it paid its analysts.' 2 2 Spitzer then led a multistate effort,
joined by the SEC, to subpoena email from twelve other banks.' 23
State and federal enforcers worked together to negotiate a compre-
business strategies as a way of differentiating their offerings from those of more dominant
firms with larger market shares").
116 William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Mat-
ters, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2129, 2133 (2004) ("What puts the 'general' in 'attorney general' is
not strength but scope: 'general' defines the ambit of the 'power of attorney' given to the
lawyer in question, distinguishing... lawyers with general powers of attorney from those
with particular or specific appointments.").
117 Provost, supra note 99, at 40 (discussing New York's 1921 Martin Act).
118 JamesTraub, The Attorney General Goes to War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 16,2002, at
38, 41.
119 Adi Ignatius, Wall Street's Top Cop, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 64, 71(internal quotation
marks omitted).
120 Traub, supra note 118, at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 38-40.
123 Ignatius, supra note 119, at 71 (explaining that "[t]he SEC jumped in" after Spitzer's
$100 million settlement with Merrill, and participated with states in going after 12 other
investment banks).
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hensive settlement, under which the banks ultimately agreed to pay
about $1.4 billion in fines and other penalties.12 4
Spitzer was similarly aggressive in other areas within the SEC's
jurisdiction. In a recent study, Eric Zitzewitz, an economist at
Dartmouth College, examined twenty large settlements between the
SEC and firms accused of market timing and late trading violations. 25
New York was involved in some, but not all, of those settlements. The
research suggests that "New York's involvement had a significant
effect on the outcome of settlement negotiations"-raising the ratio of
restitution-to-harm tenfold, from 0.07 to 0.77.126 After controlling for
other case characteristics, Zitzewitz concluded that New York was not
simply choosing cases that were destined for large settlements, but
rather that Spitzer and others in his office were more aggressive in
their negotiations than the SEC.127 Zitzewitz offers several possible
explanations for the divergence in approach. One is that state and fed-
eral enforcers disagreed on the appropriate metric for calculating
harm to shareholders.1 2 8 Another possibility is that Spitzer's "political
career concerns led him to be [ ] aggressive" while "the SEC staff's
career concerns [led] them to take pro-industry positions."'1 29
Zitzewitz's take on Spitzer is hardly unique. Spitzer's work as attorney
general was repeatedly criticized as being motivated by political ambi-
tion,130 and his eventual (and successful) run for Governor surprised
virtually no one.
Nor was Spitzer unique as an attorney general. Other examples of
entrepreneurial enforcement include state-led campaigns against the
124 Id.
125 Eric W. Zitzewitz, Prosecutorial Discretion in Mutual Fund Settlement Negotiations,
2003-7, 9 BERKELEY ELEC. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y, no. 1, art. 24, 2009 at 1, available
at http://www.bepress.comlbejeap/vo19/issl/art24/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
126 Id. at 33.
127 Id. at 3.
128 Id. at 34.
129 Id. at 35; see also Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROS-
ECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW To REGULATE CORPORATE CON-
DUCT 27 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (attributing SEC inaction to
capture).
130 See, e.g., William J. Holstein & Edward M. Kopko, Spitzer's Climate of Fear, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 23, 2004, at B2 ("Rather than engaging in careful formulation of policy, Mr.
Spitzer seems to be building his political career by collecting trophies."); Ignatius, supra
note 119, at 70 ("The rap on Spitzer is that he's ambitious, that he has his eye on a bigger
prize. To his (off-the-record) critics on Wall Street, his pursuit of investment banks smacks
of opportunism and grandstanding, of a public official out of control."); John J. McConnell,
Spitzer's Big Lie, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at A18 (suggesting that Spitzer aggressively
pursued flimsy case against Merrill in order to "further his own career").
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tobacco industry, 31 makers of lead-based paint, 132 prescription drug
marketing programs,133 student lending practices, 34 handgun manu-
facturers, 135 and, most recently, the mortgage-servicing industry. 36 In
the context of federal law enforcement, state attorneys general have
gained notoriety in the antitrust context for pursuing practices-such
as resale price maintenance and vertical restraints-that have been
deemphasized by the federal enforcement agencies. 37 Indeed,
NAAG's guidelines on vertical restraints "openly counter"
Department of Justice guidelines in the same field. 38
131 For a detailed analysis of the states' legal theory in the tobacco litigation, see Hanoch
Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354, 382-405 (2000).
132 See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General
and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 925-29 (2008) (discussing
Rhode Island litigation against lead paint manufacturers).
133 See Stephen Paul Mahinka & Kathleen M. Sanzo, Multistate Antitrust and Consumer
Protection Investigations: Practical Concerns, 63 ANITRUST L.J. 213, 221-23 (1994) (dis-
cussing states' controversial campaign against common marketing and compensation sys-
tems for prescription drugs).
134 See Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 33, 42-43 (2009) (describing attorneys general campaign against
lending industry, which "served to prod federal efforts" in same field); see also Examining
Unethical Practices in the Student Loan Industry: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 110th Cong. 14 (2007) (statement of Andrew M. Cuomo, Att'y Gen., New
York) ("Part of the reason the practices we have uncovered have been able to flourish
nationwide over the past several years is because the U.S. Department of Education has
been asleep at the switch.").
135 See William H. Pryor, Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions
and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885, 1902-03, 1908-09, 1915-16 (1999)
(critiquing state-led litigation against gun manufacturers).
136 See Press Release, Columbia Law Sch., Expert Says Foreclosure Problems Should
Serve as Wake-Up Call for Banks To Cooperate with States (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/media-inquiries/newsevents /2010/ October20l0/
foreclosures-tierney (describing state-led investigation into practices of mortgage-servicing
industry).
137 Folsom, supra note 90, at 953-54; see also Mahinka & Sanzo, supra note 133, at
216-17 (noting that while enforcement against resale price maintenance was "virtually
nonexistent at the federal level[,] ... state attorneys general have devoted considerable
resources to this issue and have initiated a number of high-profile enforcement
initiatives").
138 Folsom, supra note 90, at 954 (internal quotation marks omitted). State and federal
enforcers took different positions in a recent Supreme Court case concerning one form of
vertical restraint, resale price maintenance. Compare Brief for State of New York et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) ("The States have a particular interest in preserving
the per se prohibition against the price-fixing practice challenged here-minimum resale
price maintenance ('minimum RPM'). The States vigorously prosecute cases involving
minimum RPM agreements."), with Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 3, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No.
06-480) ("The per se rule against vertical minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) estab-
lished in Dr. Miles is irreconcilable with this Court's modem antitrust jurisprudence and
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To be sure, the patterns sketched here will not hold across the
board. First, federal enforcement is not always specialized, and state
enforcement will not always be controlled by generalist attorneys gen-
eral. Particularly in large states, offices of the attorneys general may
be divided into bureaus that handle certain issues, and the attorney
general may have little day-to-day involvement in most enforcement
actions.1 39 Nevertheless, the attorney general will play a central role in
setting the agenda for the office as a whole-identifying priorities,
crafting strategies, and so on. To some extent, the same is true at the
federal level, though the effect is quite different. Many federal civil
enforcement actions are handled by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
rather than by a specialized agency.'40 Although DOJ lawyers do spe-
cialize to some extent, they are more generalist in their orientation
than the agencies they represent, and they answer to the (generalist)
U.S. Attorney General. The influence of DOJ generalists, however, is
unlikely to inspire federal agencies to adopt a broader or more
entrepreneurial enforcement agenda. The DOJ may decline to pursue
an enforcement action proposed by an agency, but it does not initiate
civil enforcement on its own. As Neal Devins and Michael Herz have
explained, "[s]hould DOJ learn of possible violations warranting
investigation, it forwards the information to the agency; an actual civil
action will not go forward without a referral from the agency to
DOJ.'' 41 Thus, to the extent that DOJ participation influences federal
enforcement, it tends to operate as a brake rather than an accelerant.
Second, federal enforcement will not always be weak and state
enforcement always strong. Federal agencies sometimes will be
inspired to act aggressively, particularly when federal policy makers
scramble to respond to highly salient events.1 42 Similarly, the quest for
electoral support sometimes will push state attorneys general away
cannot withstand analysis. That per se rule should be abandoned, and Dr. Miles should be
overruled.").
139 See, e.g., Our Office, ATr'Y GEN. OF NEW YORK, http://www.ag.ny.gov/our-office.
html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (listing specialized bureaus).
140 Some independent agencies have independent litigation authority, but most agencies
must be represented by the DOJ if they go to court. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) ("Except as
otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an
agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is
reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney
General."). For exceptions, see Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor
General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 264 (1994).
141 Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of
Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 562-63 (2003).
142 See Pritchard, supra note 21, at 1076 (discussing "cyclical pattern of neglect and hys-
terical overreaction that typifies securities regulation emanating from both the SEC and
Congress").
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from aggressive enforcement. State enforcers are subject to capture by
local business or other interests and may shy away from enforcement
when the targets are local.143 Yet it bears repeating that the set of
interest-group pressures will be different at the state and federal levels
and from state to state. 144 State enforcers' elected status gives them
incentives to tailor enforcement to their constituents' interests-
whatever they are. Just as political trends at the federal level may pro-
voke more or less federal agency enforcement, attorneys general's
commitments may lead them to champion some causes and ignore
others. The results will vary from state to state.
Finally, while federal politicians can sell deregulation and nonen-
forcement to voters on an "anti big-government" platform, it is diffi-
cult to imagine the same strategy working for most attorneys general.
One need not subscribe to the cynical view that attorneys general
choose cases based solely on political considerations in order to con-
clude that their elected status gives them incentives to act, and to act
in public ways. It should come as no surprise, then, that attorneys gen-
eral from both parties take pains to advertise their accomplishments
to voters. The issues they advertise may differ-for example,
143 For example, many of the states that initially refused to join the litigation against the
tobacco industry were major tobacco producers. See MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE
163 (2002) (discussing refusal of Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia to join tobacco litigation, in part due to political constraints faced
by attorneys general in these states); cf. Barkow, supra note 129, at 17 ("[E]lected prosecu-
tors will tend to under-regulate because they have competing concerns that favor
industry."); Elizabeth A. Harris & Michael Barbaro, Hedge Fund Links Major Donors to
G.O.P. Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,2010, at A24 (reporting that 25% of contributions to
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., Republican candidate for attorney general in New York, could be
traced to hedge fund "whose chief executive has emerged as a staunch and influential
defender of Wall Street," and noting that Donovan "has repeatedly promoted his cautious,
nonconfrontational approach to Wall Street"); Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer,
LEGAL AFFAIRS 50 (June 2004) (" 'You rarely run for attorney general successfully by pros-
ecuting the biggest corporations in your state, represented by the best law firms, with the
best PR firms spinning it'...." (quoting Scott Harshbarger, former Attorney General of
Massachusetts)). The targets of state enforcement may be significantly more alert to
enforcement efforts than the diffuse group of beneficiaries. And after the Supreme Court's
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), there are
few constraints on corporate defendants' ability to retaliate politically against aggressive
attorneys general. The implications of Citizens United for law enforcement are, as yet,
unexplored.
144 See Hills, supra note 77, at 23 ("[State politicians] are captured by a different set of
interests than those dominant in Washington, D.C., because state constituencies contain a
different mix of interests than the nation as a whole."). Moreover, the dynamics of regula-
tory capture may vary between specialized agencies and generalist attorneys general. See
Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 93-94 (1992) (arguing that single-purpose agencies are
more susceptible to regulatory capture than general-purpose offices like that of attorney
general).
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Republican attorneys general running for re-election or higher office
in 2010 emphasized issues like combating child pornography, while
Democrats were more likely to highlight the environment-but the
theme is action rather than inaction. 145
4. Financial Incentives
A final difference between state and federal enforcement con-
cerns the role of money. No enforcer can ignore money. Litigation is
expensive, and even the most public-spirited enforcer needs funds.
Nevertheless, a conventional-if imperfect-way to distinguish public
from private enforcement is by reference to financial incentives. 146
Private enforcement is often profit-driven; public enforcement is not.
Private parties and their attorneys stand to benefit directly from suc-
cessful enforcement efforts; public enforcers do not. While public
enforcers may seek hefty penalties in order to punish or deter viola-
145 See, e.g., DUSTIN MCDANIEL, ATr'Y GEN., http://www.dustinmcdaniel.com/story
(last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (describing Arkansas Democrat Dustin McDaniel as "the state's
... top consumer advocate" and identifying his priorities as "[c]urbing methamphetamine
production, eliminating payday lenders, and assisting consumers through his health care
bureau"); Jerry Brown Accomplishments as Attorney General, JERRY BROWN, http://
jerrybrown.org/jerry-brown-accomplishments-attorney-general (last visited Apr. 20, 2011)
(listing California Democrat Jerry Brown's accomplishments as "cracking down on crime
and fighting for fairness," "fighting for public safety and against corporate abuse,"
"fighting to keep California fair and pristine," and "reducing the attorney general's oper-
ating budget"); About Dick, RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR
CONNECTIcuT, http://blumenthal.senate.gov/about/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2011) (describing
Connecticut Democrat and former attorney general Richard Blumenthal as "[a] key player
in the national fight against Big Tobacco" and emphasizing that "[h]is aggressive law
enforcement for consumer protection, environmental stewardship, labor rights, and per-
sonal privacy.., resulted in the recovery of hundreds of millions of dollars for Connecticut
taxpayers . . . each year"); Accomplishments, BEAU BIDEN, DELAWARE'S ATr'Y GEN.,
http://www.beaubiden.comlabout/accomplishments (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (high-
lighting Delaware Democrat Beau Biden's "record of standing up for kids and families,"
combating senior abuse and crime, and acting as "watchdog for consumers"); About Mike
Cox, MIKECox2010.CoM, http://mikecox20l0.com/meet-mike (last visited Apr. 20, 2011)
(emphasizing that Michigan Republican Mike Cox "has already made a name for himself
as a strong leader who is willing to make bold moves, cut spending and produce record-
setting results"); About Jon Bruning, BRUNING FOR U.S. SENATE, http://jonbruning.com/
about-jon/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (reporting of Nebraska Republican Jon Bruning that
"[h]is efforts have increased Nebraska consumer recoveries from just under $500,000 total
to nearly $1 million annually"); Tom Corbett's Story, TOM CORBETT FOR GOVERNOR,
http://www.tomcorbettforgovernor.com/meet-the-team/tom-corbett/ (last visited Apr. 20,
2011) (highlighting Pennsylvania Republican Tom Corbett's "efforts to protect our chil-
dren from internet predators, our seniors from fraud and abuse, our communities from
gangs and the violence associated with illegal drugs ... [and] to protect taxpayers' hard
earned money by going after predatory lenders, pharmaceutical companies and big oil
companies that took advantage of consumers").
146 See Rubenstein, supra note 116, at 2139-40 (describing differing financial incentives
of public and private attorneys based on differences in payment structure).
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tors,'1 47 they rarely have an immediate or personal financial stake in
the case.
State enforcers have incentives to pursue monetary recoveries
that destabilize these familiar distinctions between public and private
enforcement, further distinguishing state enforcement from the fed-
eral model. First, states may sue to vindicate what are essentially pri-
vate interests. For example, states enforce federal antitrust law against
firms whose anticompetitive conduct harmed the state government in
its capacity as a purchaser. 148 Similarly, states may enforce federal
securities law on behalf of large public pension plans. 149 In such
instances, the state's interest is largely the same as that of a private
purchaser or investor, as is the state's desire for compensation. 50
Second, federal law often authorizes states to sue as parens
patriae on behalf of private parties.151 In those cases, the state
147 See generally Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish (2010) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (arguing that retribution goal best describes agency penalty policies).
148 HoucK, supra note 89, at 5 ("The states play a prominent role in antitrust enforce-
ment by virtue of their representation of state agencies, which are major direct purchasers
of many commodities and frequent targets of bid-rigging and other price-fixing
conspiracies.").
149 See 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2006) (restricting private class actions but preserving right of "a
State or political subdivision thereof or a State pension plan [to] bring[ ] an action
involving a covered security on its own behalf, or as a member of a class comprised solely
of other States, political subdivisions, or State pension plans that are named plaintiffs").
Ohio's recent suit against Bank of America is an example of such an action. See Press
Release, Ohio Att'y Gen. Richard Cordray, Consolidated Amended Complaint Filed in
Shareholder Lawsuit Against Bank of America (Sept. 28, 2009), available at http://
ohioattorneygeneral.gov/SecuritiesLitigation/Briefing (discussing suit). Ohio Attorney
General Richard Cordray, during his unsuccessful re-election campaign in 2010, vowed to
"hold Wall Street accountable for their actions in harming Ohio investors, retirees, workers
and families through violations of securities laws." John Michael Spinelli, Ohio AG
Cordray Readies AIG Case as House GOP Asks Him To Challenge Federal Health Care
Proposal, COLUMBus GoV'T EXAMINER, Feb. 20, 2010, http://www.examiner.com/
government-in-columbuslohio-ag-cordray-readies-aig-case-as-house-gop-asks-him-to-
challenge-federal-health-care-proposal. Cordray's 2009 Annual Report boasts recoveries
of more than $2 billion "for investors." 2009 OHIo A-rr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 6, available at
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/AnnualReport2009.
150 See Rubenstein, supra note 116, at 2141 (explaining that compensation is conven-
tionally conceived as private goal, and that "when the government pursues compensatory
damages, it is typically seeking to be made whole for losses it has suffered in its more
proprietary, not law-enforcement, functions").
151 The FTC has similar authority under § 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006), to seek equitable monetary remedies for violations of any laws
within its jurisdiction. In practice, the FTC has used that authority almost exclusively in
consumer protection cases. See 2010 Fed. Trade Comm'n Ann. Rep. 48, available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/ChairmansReport2010.pdf ("From March 2009 through March
2010, the FTC's Redress Administration Office mailed redress checks to 2,598,799 con-
sumers for a total of more than $63.6 million."); see also Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement
Official's Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 413, 431 (1997) (dis-
cussing FTC's sparing use of § 13(b) in competition cases). In recent years-and perhaps as
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attorney general plays a role akin to that of private counsel.15 2
Although state enforcers lack private attorneys' strong incentive to
maximize their own fees, they may benefit in various ways from large
damage (and fee) recoveries. Much as private attorneys use hefty
damage recoveries to build their reputations and lure new clients,
state enforcers trumpet their successes to the public in order to garner
electoral support. And while success can mean many things, recov-
ering money for the citizens themselves is a particularly impressive
feat for an elected official. 153
a result of competition with state attorneys general-the FTC has expanded its use of
§ 13(b) to obtain restitution in antitrust cases, perhaps as a result of competition with state
attorneys general. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
152 Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and
the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1, 4
(2000) (noting that "some ... government lawsuits seek money damages for defendants'
injurious conduct toward citizens," thereby "mix[ing] the roles of public and private
lawyers").
153 Attorneys general regularly publicize any damage awards that are returned to citi-
zens. See, e.g., Press Release, Ark. Att'y Gen. Dustin McDaniel, McDaniel Gives $25,000
to Arkansas Foodbank Network (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://ag.arkansas.gov/
newsroom/index.php?do:newsDetail=l&newsid=304 ("Attorney General Dustin
McDaniel presented a $25,000 check to the Arkansas Foodbank Network today .... The
funding is from part of a 2006 settlement with Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc., an
Ohio-based company that is now out of business."); Press Release, Cal. Att'y Gen.
Edmund D. Brown, Jr., Attorney General Brown Announces Landmark $8.68 Billion
Settlement with Countrywide (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/
release:php?id=1618& ("Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. today announced a
landmark, multi-state settlement with Countrywide Home Loans... that is expected to
provide up to ... $3.5 billion to California borrowers."); Press Release, Conn. Att'y Gen.
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General Announces Mailing of $60,000 in Lakeview
Restitution Checks (June 28, 2010), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2341
&Q=462338 ("Attorney General Richard Blumenthal today announced that his office has
mailed $60,000 in restitution checks to consumers who paid a Bridgeport company for
headstones that were never delivered."); Press Release, Fla. Att'y Gen. Bill McCollum,
Attorney General Reaches $4.5 Million Settlement with Office Depot for Florida Refunds,
available at http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/370FC8DA33D527C9
852577380060920D ("Attorney General Bill McCollum today announced that his office has
negotiated a settlement with Office Depot, Inc ..... Under the settlement, Office Depot
will pay approximately $4.5 million in refunds to eligible Florida customers ...."); Press
Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen., AG Cuomo Announces Over $100,000 in
Restitution Going to Consumers Victimized by 3 Car Dealerships, available at http://www.
ag.ny.gov/media-center/2010/apr/apr26a-10.html ("Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo
today announced that his office is distributing more than $100,000 in restitution to cus-
tomers of two auto dealerships in the Hudson Valley and Long Island that misrepresented
used cars for sale."); Accomplishments, BEAU BIDEN, DELAWARE'S ATrr'Y GEN., http://
www.beaubiden.com/about/accomplishments/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) ("[Delaware
Attorney General Beau Biden] has expanded the Victims Compensation Assistance Pro-
gram's (VCAP) operations to help victims of violent crime recover, reaching more
Delawareans than ever before and awarding more than $2.3 million to victims so far this
year...."); Attorney General Jon Bruning, OFFICE OF THE NEB. Arr'y GEN., http://www.
ago.state.ne.us/your/jonbruning/biography.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) ("An average of
more than $900,000 a year has been returned to victims of scams since Bruning took
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Although compensating citizens features prominently among the
justifications for parens patriae authority under federal law,154 injured
citizens do not always enjoy a direct financial benefit from state
enforcement actions. 155 Cy pres distributions, in which the proceeds of
enforcement are turned over to charities that serve as rough proxies
for the individuals injured by the defendant's conduct, are common.156
The attorney general may have substantial discretion over the ulti-
mate destination of such funds,157 which can raise concerns about a
possible political quid pro quo when the money goes to political sup-
porters or potential supporters. 158
In other cases, monetary recoveries end up in the state's own cof-
fers.159 Of course, to say that "the state" keeps the money is different
from saying that the attorney general turns a profit. 160 Nevertheless,
financial recoveries deliver important advantages to state enforcers.
office."); Attorney General Recovers $11.1 Million in Motorcycle Insurance Overcharges for
Consumers, MARTHA COAKLEY, http://www.marthacoakley.com/news/press-releases/
details/2010 -01- attorney- general -martha - coakley -recovers-- 111-million - ("Attorney
General Martha Coakley's Office entered into settlements with [companies offering insur-
ance for motorcycles] .. . , which return $11.1 million to consumers ...."); Biography,
OFFICE OF THE MINN. ATr'Y GEN., http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/AGBio.asp (last vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2011) ("Attorney General Swanson's lawsuits against insurance companies
that sold unsuitable policies to senior citizens resulted in almost $1 billion in refund offers
to consumers.").
154 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing victim compensation as goal of
state enforcement); see also First, supra note 9, at 1039-40 (emphasizing states' compara-
tive advantage at delivering remedies to consumers).
155 See Calkins, supra note 151, at 436 ("[D]espite the recovery by some state attorneys
general of substantial monetary damage awards [in antitrust cases], individual consumers
have received little in the way of monetary awards."). For cases in which consumers have
received direct payments as a result of state enforcement, see Hubbard & Yoon, supra note
9, at 507 n.47.
156 See generally Farmer, supra note 65 (describing cy pres distributions).
157 JEFFREY S. NIELSON & JEFFREY P. YUSHCHAK, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, REPORT ON POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL IN INITI-
ATING AND CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS AND LITIGATION 3 (2007), available at http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get-ilr doc.php?id=1066.
158 See Posner, supra note 9, at 258 ("I worry that state attorneys general will try to
channel the moneys recovered in their suits to charitable uses that will advance their polit-
ical agenda."); Ann Davis, To Some, Santa Has a New Name: Spitzer; New York Attorney
General Turns Settlement Funds into Gifts; Will it Grease an Election Sleigh?, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 24, 2003, at C1 (noting that "the groups receiving the windfall [from Spitzer's civil
settlements] also represent voter constituencies that could be key to Mr. Spitzer's widely
expected Democratic run for governor in 2006").
159 For example, $75 million in fines and penalties that New York collected in the Wall
Street settlements, described in the previous Section, went into the state's general treasury.
Davis, supra note 158; see also NIELSON & YUSHCHAK, supra note 157, at 15 (explaining
that five of thirteen attorneys general surveyed reported that "settlement proceeds are
generally deposited in the state's general fund").
160 Cf Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARv. L. REv. 915, 926 (2005) ("Democratic representatives ... have no obvious personal
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Especially in small states, large damage awards can make an impor-
tant difference to the state budget. Consider the master tobacco settle-
ment, in which tobacco companies agreed to pay states more than
$200 billion over twenty-five years.161 Though the money was
intended for health- and smoking-related initiatives, several states
announced that they would use it to balance their general budgets.162
If nothing else, such budgetary windfalls give attorneys general pow-
erful bragging rights. 163
State enforcers may reap an even more direct reward from
enforcement, because the arm of the state that retains money earned
in litigation is often the attorney general's office itself.164 Many fed-
eral statutes that authorize state enforcement also explicitly provide
for the payment of fees and costs to successful attorneys general. 65
Attorneys general also may retain funds paid as damages or civil pen-
alties. Depending on state law, the ultimate destination of those funds
incentive to engorge governmental coffers since, absent the most blatant forms of corrup-
tion, they derive no immediate benefit from money flowing through the treasury.").
161 See Dagan & White, supra note 131, at 371-73 (describing settlement). Not surpris-
ingly, researchers have found that the decision to enter the litigation against the tobacco
companies was influenced by the expected value of the recovery. Rorie L. Spill, Michael J.
Licari & Leonard Ray, Taking on Tobacco: Policy Entrepreneurship and the Tobacco Liti-
gation, 54 POL. RES. Q. 605, 616 (2001).
162 Dagan & White, supra note 131, at 371-72.
163 See Provost, supra note 99, at 45 ("[S]ettlements [that] produce monetary benefits
for the state and for consumers and voters ... are significant accomplishments that attor-
neys general can advertise when they run for reelection or for higher office."). Attorneys
general-particularly those who are facing upcoming elections-take pains to publicize
damage recoveries. For example, the campaign website for Terry Goddard, who
unsuccessfully ran for governor of Arizona while serving as Attorney General, stated that
he "put together an exemplary record of financial responsibility ... [, producing] more
than $267 million for the state and its consumers in settlements, restitution, penalties and
other recoveries" in FY 2010 alone. Accomplishments, TERRY GODDARD, http://
terrygoddard.com/record (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). During her successful re-election
campaign, the official state website of Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan stated that
in 2008 she had "[c]ollected $1,000,945,708.06 on behalf of the People of the State of
Illinois." About Us, ILL. Arr'y GEN., http://www.ag.state.il.us/about/index.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2011).
164 Attorneys general may also retain funds, collectively, through NAAG. See, e.g.,
Daniel Fisher, The House Tobacco Built, FORBES MAG., Sept. 1, 2008, at 98, 98-99 (dis-
cussing $140 million fund administered by NAAG as result of tobacco litigation, and $2.8
million "milk fund," named for settlement of school-milk case, used by NAAG to pay
economists and other experts).
165 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(2) (2006) (recovery of attorneys fees and costs for state
antitrust enforcement); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(c) (2006) (same for state enforcement of con-
sumer credit reporting laws); 15 U.S.C. § 7706(0(4) (2006) (same for state enforcement
against internet spammers); 49 U.S.C. §§ 32709(d)(1)(B), 32710(b) (2006) (same for state
enforcement regarding odometer tampering). Courts sometimes have interpreted statutes
that are silent as to states as permitting fee awards as well. See, e.g., New York v. 11
Cornwell Co., 718 F.2d 22, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that state may recover fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 when it sues as parens patriae under federal civil rights statute).
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may be the attorney general's office or a revolving fund devoted to a
certain category of enforcement. 66 The consequence of this "'eat
what you kill' approach"'167 is that state enforcement may be largely
self-financing.168
Finally, the lawyers in charge of state enforcement may in fact be
private attorneys. State attorneys general frequently reach out to pri-
vate counsel to assist with the state's business, including enforcement
of federal law. Fee arrangements vary, but private counsel sometimes
work for states on a contingency-fee basis.' 69 Plainly, such attorneys
166 See First, Statement, supra note 115, at 11 ("Some states use 'revolving fund' appro-
priations which require agencies to self-fund their efforts through recovery of litigation
fees in much the same way as private law firms do; others fund through general legislative
appropriations."). For example, several states have created antitrust revolving funds that
are controlled by the attorney general and consist of a percentage of antitrust recoveries
and-in some states-fee awards. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-191.01 (2004)
(depositing greater of ten percent of antitrust recoveries or actual amount expended into
revolving fund); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (West 2008) (depositing greater of ten
percent of antitrust recoveries plus attorneys' fees or actual amount expended into
revolving fund); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-715 (Supp. 2009) (depositing twenty percent of
antitrust recoveries into revolving fund); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.82 (West 2002)
(depositing ten percent of antitrust recoveries plus fees and costs into revolving fund);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.10.215 (West 2009) (antitrust fees and funds transferred to
revolving fund pursuant to court order or judgment in antitrust actions). Even in states that
do not have an antitrust revolving fund, attorneys general may retain funds for antitrust
enforcement pursuant to a court order. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 121(1) (McKinney
Supp. 2010) ("[E]very state officer ... receiving money for or on behalf of the state from
fees, penalties, forfeitures, costs, fines, refunds, reimbursements, sales of property or other-
wise, shall ... pay into the state treasury all such moneys ...."). For an example outside
the antitrust context, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17206(c)-(d) (West 2008) (providing
that funds recovered by attorney general through consumer-protection litigation must be
used to further enforce consumer protection law). See also BRANN, supra note 90, at 5 ("In
some states, the consumer protection division [of the attorney general's office] is funded,
often to a significant extent, by recoveries obtained by the division ... .
167 BRANN, supra note 90, at 5.
168 See Folsom, supra note 90, at 958 ("Public antitrust enforcement at the state and
local levels is often perceived as 'paying for itself.' In many instances this is quite literally
true.").
169 Such arrangements gained notoriety in the context of the states' litigation against the
tobacco industry, in which thirty-six states employed private attorneys to assist in the litiga-
tion "because of the fear that the state legislature would not appropriate funds needed for
suits against the major tobacco companies." Zimmerman, supra note 91, at 84. For a
thoughtful assessment of the use of contingency fee arrangements, see generally Leah
Godesky, Note, State Attorneys General and Contingency Fee Arrangements: An Affront to
the Neutrality Doctrine?, 42 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 587 (2009). Courts have accepted
the use of contingent-fee arrangements in public litigation, provided that government
attorneys exercise meaningful control. See Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d
21, 36 (Cal. 2010) ("[R]etention of private counsel on a contingent-fee basis is permissible
in [public-nuisance] cases if neutral, conflict-free government attorneys retain the power to
control and supervise the litigation."); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 475 (R.I.
2008) (holding that contingency fee agreement between attorney general and private
counsel is permissible in civil case, provided that attorney general retains "absolute and
total control over all critical decision-making" (emphasis omitted)).
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have a strong incentive to maximize damage recoveries. 70 While the
attorneys general themselves do not collect contingency fees, they
may gain additional political support from powerful local attorneys. 171
State enforcers' ability to recover funds for their constituents,
political supporters, state treasuries, and their own offices affects their
incentives to enforce. State enforcers may not pursue financial penal-
ties with the single-minded focus that theorists associate with private
parties, but they are not immune to the pull of money. The prospect of
financial recoveries may lead state attorneys general to choose dif-
ferent cases than their federal counterparts do.172 Even when state
and federal enforcers go after the same defendant, states may be
looking for something different-money. 173 And states' ability to fund
enforcement with enforcement means that state enforcement can pro-
ceed even when the public resources devoted to enforcement are
limited.
170 See Erichson, supra note 152, at 36 ("In contrast to the government lawyer's incen-
tives, the contingent fee lawyer's incentives are more entrepreneurial than political. Gener-
ally, the contingent fee lawyer's primary incentive is to maximize the monetary recovery,
which corresponds with the primary interest of most private plaintiffs.").
171 See generally Peter W. Huber, Guns, Tobacco, Big Macs-and the Courts, COMMEN-
TARY, June 1999, at 32, 36 ("A state attorney general eyeing his next campaign for Senator
or Governor can give his own political fortunes a boost by bringing home a billion or two
from an out-of-state industry, and sharing 30 percent with prominent citizens back
home."); JOHN FUND, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, CASH IN, CONTRACTS
OUT: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE A-rORNEYS GENERAL AND THE PLAINTIFFS'
BAR 6-11 (2004), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get-ilr-doc.php?id=
820 (citing numerous examples of attorneys general awarding contingency-fee contracts to
campaign contributors).
172 See Erichson, supra note 152, at 21 ("Some commentators have criticized the state
attorneys general for behaving too much like private plaintiffs' lawyers. The Wall Street
Journal complained of the 'sue-the-socks-off-em compulsions' of the state attorneys gen-
eral, arguing that 'the attorneys general increasingly have become little more than depu-
tized posses running raids against the private sector."' (quoting Editorial, Who's Next,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2000, at A26)); Folsom, supra note 90, at 958-59 ("[T]he self-
supporting nature of state antitrust law enforcement ... provides a ready argument for
defense counsel that state antitrust enforcement actions are brought to fill the coffers of
public prosecutors."); FUND, supra note 171, at 15 ("The pattern set by the state AGs and
their plaintiff-lawyer allies is clear: First, find an industry with deep pockets, then make a
squeeze play."); Provost, supra note 99, at 44 ("[M]any allies of business have accused
some attorneys general of filing frivolous lawsuits and using huge cash settlements to fill
state coffers.").
173 See Mahinka & Sanzo, supra note 133, at 233 ("[Tlhe states have focused in settle-
ment agreements on the recovery of civil penalties and administrative costs ... [tjo a much
greater degree than the federal antitrust and consumer protection agencies."); see also
First, supra note 9, at 1039 ("If there is one consistent threat to state antitrust enforcement
in the past sixty years, it is the effort to collect money damages for violations of the anti-
trust laws."); cf BRANN, supra note 90, at 5 (explaining that states in which consumer
protection enforcement is funded by recoveries tend to place "emphasis ... on settling
cases, as opposed to engaging in lengthy, expensive, and uncertain, litigation" and that
"settlements are then structured to make sure that they include a financial component").
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B. The Power of Enforcement
We have seen that state enforcement differs in important respects
from enforcement by federal agencies. To some extent, the divergence
between state and federal enforcement maps onto the divergence
between state and federal law: We can expect states to act differently
because they represent different sets of interests. Yet the analogy
between enforcement and regulation only goes so far. State enforce-
ment is distinguished not only by the familiar divisions between state
and federal interests, but also by features that are peculiar to enforce-
ment: the characteristics of elected attorneys general compared to
specialist federal agencies and the influence of financial incentives.
Enforcement authority is also different from regulatory authority
as a channel for state influence. Enforcement has gone largely unno-
ticed by students of federalism, who tend to "identif[y] preserving
state regulatory autonomy as central to the project of federalism. ' 174
When viewed from that perspective, the omission is understandable.
After all, states are enforcing federal law. But the differences between
state and federal enforcement described above do not depend on vari-
ations in the underlying law being enforced. On the contrary, enforce-
ment opens up avenues for state influence even when state actors are
enforcing a federal rule. States can influence policy by adjusting the
level of enforcement and by pressing novel interpretations of federal
law. And states' choices regarding enforcement can have important
practical consequences both within each state and nationwide, as
courts, federal enforcers, and regulated entities respond to states'
efforts. Enforcement therefore warrants attention as a distinct source
of state power-a power that can exist even where states do not have,
or have not exercised, regulatory authority.
1. Policy Making Through Enforcement
To see how enforcement can operate as an instrument for
state-level policy making, consider the Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act (CPSIA). 175 Enacted in 2008, the Act aims to
strengthen federal consumer product safety standards, in part by
adding a provision for state enforcement. 176 Among other things, the
CPSIA banned the manufacture and sale of children's toys containing
174 Metzger, supra note 76, at 2026 n.4.
175 Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2057c (Supp. III
2010)).
176 For a comprehensive discussion of the CSPIA and the various agency failures that
prompted its enactment, see Widman, supra note 9, at 179-91. Widman celebrates state
enforcement of the CSPIA as a way for states to give effect to federal law in instances
where the relevant federal agency underenforces. Id. at 213-14.
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"concentrations of more than 0.1 percent" of certain chemicals-
known as phthalates-which are used to soften plastic.177 Although
there are questions at the margins about what constitutes a children's
toy,178 there is a core set of products to which the ban clearly and
unequivocally applies. Even in those circumstances where the federal
rule operates unambiguously, enforcement authority allows states to
influence policy by adjusting the intensity of enforcement and hence
the degree to which manufacturers are deterred from using phtha-
lates. States with a strong commitment to consumer protection can
devote resources to identifying and pursuing violations, while those
that wish to court business from toy manufacturers can abstain from
enforcement. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the deci-
sion by an elected attorney general to take action in the consumer-
protection field is influenced by citizen ideology: Attorneys general
from "liberal" states do more, while those from "conservative" states
do less. 179
The range of enforcement discretion increases when there is
room for debate about the meaning of federal law. For example, states
have expressed disagreement with federal regulators' interpretations
of the scope of the phthalates ban. The statute provides that, as of
February 10, 2009, "it shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture
for sale [or] offer for sale" products containing phthalates. 180 The fed-
eral Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) issued an advisory
opinion letter stating that it would not enforce the ban against prod-
ucts manufactured before the effective date, even if they were sold
after it.181 Several nonprofit advocacy groups successfully challenged
the CPSC's interpretation as contrary to the Act.182 Connecticut
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal filed an amicus brief in sup-
177 15 U.S.C. § 2057c(a) (Supp. III 2010) ("Beginning on the date that is 180 days after
August 14, 2008, it shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture for sale, offer for sale,
distribute in commerce, or import into the United States any children's toy or child care
article that contains concentrations of more than 0.1 percent of di-(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate
(DEHP), dibutyl phthalate (DBP), or benzyl butyl phthalate (BBP).").
178 See Andrew Martin, Crackdown on Toy Safety Rules Proves No Fun for Toy Makers,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010, at Al (discussing uncertainties about scope of CPSIA).
179 Provost, supra note 99, at 51.
180 15 U.S.C. § 2057c(a).
181 Advisory Opinion Letter from Cheryl A. Falvey, Gen. Counsel, Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n, to Georgia C. Ravitz (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.crowell.coml
PDF/CPSC-Phthalates-Opinion-Letter-and-Memorandum.pdf; see also Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 597 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(describing CPSC's interpretation). For a more detailed discussion of the battle over the
phthalates ban, see Widman, supra note 9, at 186-88.
182 See Natural Res. Def Council, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 390 (rejecting CPSC's interpreta-
tion as "contrary to the language and structure of the CPSIA[ ] and ... inconsistent with
the CPSA's purpose and the CPSIA's legislative history").
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port of the plaintiffs and argued that the federal agency had misinter-
preted the statute and offering a contrary assessment of Congress's
intent. Blumenthal later issued a press release trumpeting the plain-
tiffs' win and vowing to "take whatever steps are necessary to ensure
that this phthalate ban is enforced."'1 83
The potential for divergence between state and federal
approaches to enforcement is even greater in areas where federal law
is written in broad terms-particularly where no federal agency has
authority to narrow and clarify the law through binding regulations.
Antitrust is an example. As noted in the previous Section, states have
adopted guidelines on vertical restraints that depart from the stan-
dards followed by federal enforcement agencies. States also have
taken a distinctive approach to antitrust merger enforcement.
Although state and federal merger enforcement differ in several
respects, 184 perhaps the most prominent disagreement centers on the
relevance of a proposed merger's impact on local jobs. The NAAG
Horizontal Merger Guidelines recognize that, in addition to competi-
tive consequences, mergers "may also have other consequences that
are relevant to the social and political goals of section 7 [of the
Clayton Act]. For example, mergers may affect the opportunities for
small and regional business to survive and compete." 185 Those conse-
quences, the Guidelines continue, "may affect the Attorneys
General's ultimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion .... ,,186 The
federal guidelines make no mention of such considerations. 187 Critics
argue that states' concern about the loss of local businesses and jobs is
183 Press Release, Conn. Att'y Gen. Office, Attorney General Praises Decision Blocking
Manufacturers From Allowing Sale of Toxic Toys (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://
www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=3673&Q=433514; see also Widman, supra note 9, at
194-97 (discussing additional clash between Blumenthal and CPSC). California Attorney
General Edmund G. Brown, Jr. has likewise expressed disagreement with the CPSC's
interpretation of the statute's text and its reading of congressional intent. Letter from
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Cal. Att'y Gen., to Cheryl A. Falvey, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n (Mar. 25, 2009), available at http://ag.ca.gov/prop65/pdfs/
CA.phthalatejletter.pdf.
184 See Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Horizontal Merger Guidelines, at 5-13 (1993) [here-
inafter NAAG, Horizontal Merger Guidelines], available at http://www.naag.org/assets/
files/pdf/at-hmerger-guidelines.pdf (discussing various points of divergence between state
and federal approaches to antitrust merger enforcement); see also David A. Zimmerman,
Comment, Why State Attorneys General Should Have a Limited Role in Enforcing the
Federal Antitrust Law of Mergers, 48 EMORY L.J. 337, 349-59 (1999) (same).
185 NAAG, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 184, at § 2.
186 Id.
187 See U.S. Dep't of Justice and the Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
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inconsistent with the statutory text and congressional intent, 188 while
states' defenders insist that "preserving the competitive process
requires preserving separate competitors, and jobs are part of pre-
serving that separate decision maker."'18 9 Such a fundamental disa-
greement about the basic goals of federal law is made possible by the
nature of the relevant statute, which defines prohibited mergers in
vague terms and relies on courts rather than an agency to flesh out the
details. 190
As some of these examples suggest, enforcement authority cre-
ates opportunities for states to influence policy not only within their
own borders, but also on a national scale. State enforcement may
change the federal "law in the books" by generating judicial decisions
that clarify the scope of the law. In the 1980s, for example, nineteen
states banded together to sue a group of domestic and foreign insurers
and reinsurers. The states alleged collusive activity in violation of fed-
eral antitrust law. They had urged the Department of Justice to pursue
similar claims, but federal enforcers took the view that "collusion is
highly unlikely in unconcentrated industries like the property and cas-
ualty insurance industry."'191 Nevertheless, the states' lawsuit was suc-
cessful and resulted in a Supreme Court decision defining the extent
of the insurance exemption 92 establishing "an expansive scope for
U.S. antitrust enforcement against foreign conduct by foreign par-
ties."'193 The decision has been described as one of the "ten milestones
in 20th century antitrust law,"'1 94 and federal enforcers rely on its pre-
cedent in many international cartel cases today. 95
188 See Zimmerman, supra note 184, at 347 n.49 ("The protection of small business has
been discussed as a goal of antitrust law since the Sherman Act, but scholars generally
agree that such a goal is inconsistent with the legislative history of the antitrust laws and
with sound public policy."); see also DeBow, supra note 94, at 276 (discussing "state
merger case shot through with parochialism" in which "district judge noted that 'nothing in
the Clayton Act or other federal antitrust laws addressed [the state's] concern about [a
local] plant closing"').
189 Hubbard & Yoon, supra note 9, at 513.
190 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (defining prohibited mergers as acquisitions whose "effect...
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly").
191 Michael F. Brockmeyer, State Antitrust Enforcement, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 169, 170
(1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
193 ROBERT SKITOL, DRINKER BIDDLE, TEN MILESTONES IN 20TH CENTURY ANTITRUST
LAW AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO THE DECADE AHEAD (1999), http://www.drinkerbiddle.
com/publications/Detail.aspx?pub=317&servicesearch=0.
194 Id.
195 Kevin J. O'Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, 15 ANTITRUST 34, 38 n.32
(2000). For other examples of pathbreaking antitrust decisions spurred by state action, see
Hubbard & Yoon, supra note 9, at 516-20, and Jay L. Himes, Chief, Antitrust Bureau,
Office of the Att'y Gen. of the State of N.Y., Federal "Un-emption" of State Antitrust
Enforcement, Remarks at the Antitrust, Competition and Trade Committee of LEX
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State enforcement also may have wide-ranging effects when state
practices prompt a shift in enforcement by federal agencies. For
example, one commentator has suggested that the FTC's decision to
reconsider its use of restitution as a remedy for antitrust violations
was spurred by states' pursuit of monetary remedies. 196 Similarly,
states' enforcement efforts may have nationwide consequences
because of their impact on the regulated community, even if the law
on the books remains the same. One state's aggressive enforcement
can prompt potential defendants to change their practices across the
board. 97 The impact is amplified when multiple states work
together. 198
2. Enforcement as a Distinct Form of State Authority
I have argued that enforcement authority enables states to shape
policy at both the state and national level. That is not to say, however,
that enforcement is a substitute for regulatory authority. States
unquestionably enjoy more power when they are able to write the
rules as well as enforce them. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to
view enforcement as nothing more than a watered-down version of
legislation or implementation of a federal scheme that leaves room for
state regulation. Enforcement authority may be available in areas
MUNDI 13-14 (May 14, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/
at-state/pdf/publications/other-pubs/unemption.pdf.
196 First, Statement, supra note 115, at 14-15; cf John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spitzer Legacy
and the Cuomo Future, 329 N.Y. L.J. 5, 6 (Mar. 20, 2008) (arguing that competition with
Eliot Spitzer caused "the total amount of SEC-obtained restitution plus penalties ... [to]
rise[ ] hyperbolically").
197 See Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or Deceptive
Practices, 56 AN-itRUST L.J. 125, 133 (1987) ("Much of the remedies in state consumer
protection actions really have been national in scope. One reason is simply the question of
market necessity. So, a locally-imposed remedy by New York State in the case of
Nutrasweet labeling on soda cans was applied nationally by 7-Up, Coca-Cola, and the
others."); Posner, supra note 9, at 259 ("The danger is that interstate businesses will be
forced to conform their business practices to the most restrictive state interpretation of
federal antitrust law."); Rose, supra note 9, at 2205 ("[M]arket participants will predictably
respond to the signals of the strictest enforcer with authority over them and conform their
behavior accordingly.").
198 See Thomas A. Schmeling, Stag Hunting with the State AG: Anti-Tobacco Litigation
and the Emergence of Cooperation Among State Attorneys General, 25 LAw & PoL'Y 429,
430 (2003) ("Acting together, the [state attorneys general] have won legal settlements or
concessions from tobacco companies, auto manufacturers, toy makers, paint producers,
and others, agreements that would have been quite unlikely if sought by individual [state
attorneys general] acting alone."); Waltenburg & Swinford, supra note 104, at 248 ("[The
states] have come to recognize that they actually can affect and shape national policy
through coordinated law enforcement efforts .... ).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 2011]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
where regulatory authority is not. 199 Enforcement also empowers dif-
ferent actors, creating new opportunities for state influence.
As explained in the previous Section, federal statutes that
authorize state enforcement typically name the state attorney general
as the relevant state actor. By contrast, federal statutes that provide
for state implementation tend to rely on a specialist state agency to
partner with the relevant federal agency. Indeed, such statutes often
contain "single agency" requirements that "essentially force state gov-
ernments to delegate responsibility for administering a federally
funded program to a single state agency that specializes in the pro-
gram. ' 200 Scholars have shown that state bureaucracies share much in
common with their federal counterparts; their mutual specialization
may outweigh federal-state differences. This idea is captured by the
picket-fence metaphor, where appointed state and federal agency spe-
cialists are represented by the vertical fence posts and elected state
and federal generalists by the horizontal rails.201 As the image sug-
gests, state agencies may be defined more by their subject-matter spe-
cialization-a feature they share with a federal agency-than by their
affiliation with state government.202
State attorneys general represent a different breed of state actor.
While attorneys general and their staff may have connections with cer-
tain federal agencies, those connections seldom resemble the interde-
pendent web that marks many federal-state agency relationships. As
generalists, attorneys general must develop positions on a range of
policy issues and negotiate among competing initiatives. As elected
officials, attorneys general have ample incentive to make a name for
themselves by challenging federal orthodoxy.
State attorneys general also may differ politically from other state
actors, such as legislators and governors. It is not uncommon for a
state's attorney general to hail from a different political party than
both the governor and the majority of the state's legislators. That
political diversity increases the range of viewpoints that may be repre-
sented by "the state" in its interactions with the federal government.
199 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (providing examples of federal statutes
that permit state enforcement of federal law yet preempt state law).
200 Hills, supra note 76, at 860 n.167.
201 Id. at 883 n.241 (discussing "picket-fence" federalism and citing TERRY SANFORD,
STORM OVER THE STATES 80 (1967)); see also Sharkey, supra note 77, at 2158 n.128 ("[A]
precondition for... cooperative federalism is likely the existence of intricately linked state
and federal agencies, with built-in incentives and opportunities for communication as well
as constructive collaboration.").
202 It does not follow that state and federal agencies will always agree, of course. For
examples of "uncooperative federalism," including state-federal agency clashes, see
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 76, at 1271--84.
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Indeed, the same may be true even in the absence of political party
differences. As one commentator has explained,
even when from the same party, the [attorney general and
governor] can [be], and often are, divided by personal rivalries or
ideological differences. And even when the two officers agree on a
particular issue, they may compete with each other to be the most
aggressive in addressing the issue to curry favor with a particular
constituency.203
By empowering state attorneys general, federal law facilitates
such competition among state actors. The most obvious example is
where federal law authorizes the state attorney general to enforce
rules that the state legislature could have enacted on its own-but did
not. This possibility is not merely hypothetical: Several federal stat-
utes that permit state enforcement were enacted precisely because
state law was lacking.20 4
Even where other state actors already play a role in enforcing a
rule, the state attorney general may choose a different approach.
Consider the multi-state litigation against coal-burning power plants
in the Midwest. In 1999, New York's attorney general, Democrat Eliot
Spitzer, adopted a "novel legal strategy aimed at reducing smog and
acid rain in the Northeast" and announced his intention to sue plants
in several other states under an "untested provision" of the federal
Clean Air Act.20 5 New York's Department of Environmental
Conservation-which "operate[d] at the pleasure of Gov[ernor]
George E. Pataki, a Republican"-took a different approach to the
same problem.20 6 Rather than going after plant owners directly, the
state agency had petitioned the federal Environmental Protection
Agency to act. 20 7 The EPA's efforts had been hampered by a series of
legal challenges by midwestern states and utilities. 20 8 Six weeks after
Spitzer's announcement, however, the EPA used Spitzer's new legal
theory to launch an "unprecedented" enforcement initiative against
203 Marshall, supra note 8, at 2453.
204 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (listing examples).
205 Editorial, A Victory for Cleaner Air, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at A26. For a
description of the relevant provisions of federal law, see Rachel Zafrann, New York's
Novel Strategy for Combating Air Pollution, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 59, 66-70 (1999).
206 Andrew C. Revkin, In New Tactic, State Aims To Sue Utilities Over Coal Pollution,
N.Y. TimZs, Sept. 15, 1999, at Al.
207 Id.
208 See Bob Downing, Fatal Beauty, AKRON BEACON J. (Nov. 17, 2009, 7:02 PM), http://
www.ohio.com/lifestyle/downing/70327262.html (describing EPA's regulatory efforts and
industry responses); Revkin, supra note 206, at B5 (noting that round of "legal maneuvers
by the states that are home to the old coal plants has delayed new [EPA] action to stanch
the pollution").
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more than 100 plants. 20 9 New York and several other northeastern
states intervened in the EPA's suit, which eventually yielded "the big-
gest settlement-in dollar terms, as well as promised reduction in
pollutants-in the ... history of the 1970 Clean Air Act.
210
Thus, enforcement authority may open up unique outlets for
federal-state dialogue and state-driven policy. The federalism litera-
ture, with its heavy emphasis on state regulation, has ignored this fea-
ture of state enforcement. Yet state enforcement offers an opportunity
for influence-and a distinctive form of influence-quite apart from
regulatory authority.
III
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY AND THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM
The question remains whether state influence of this sort pro-
motes the values commonly associated with decentralized decision
making in a federal system. This Part explores the virtues and vices of
enforcement authority from a federalism perspective. Although the
conventional arguments for federalism focus on the advantages of reg-
ulatory competition, I show that competition over enforcement
authority yields similar benefits. It does not follow, of course, that
state enforcement of federal law will always be desirable. Decentral-
ized regulatory authority creates risks as well as rewards, as regula-
tions tailored to state interests may interfere with the broader national
interest. So too for enforcement. State enforcement of federal law
poses a threat to uniformity and may result in overenforcement.
Those are valid concerns, but they do not apply with equal force to all
exercises of state enforcement power and in most cases can be accom-
modated through careful structuring of state-enforcement provisions.
A. Enforcement Authority and the Benefits of
Decentralized Decision Making
Properly understood, federalism is a means to an end. 211 A fed-
eral system is desirable not for its own sake, but because decentralized
decision making is thought to have various desirable consequences.
2 12
209 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Expands Clean Air Act Lawsuits Against
Electric Utilities (Mar. 1, 2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2000/March/
090enrd.htm.
210 Editorial, supra note 205; see also $4.6B Pollution Payout Signals Major Shift, CBS
NEWS, Oct. 9, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2OO7/1O/09/business/
main3346547.shtml (discussing later settlement by defendant in related case).
211 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 223 (2000).
212 Scholars have debated whether a federal system in fact produces the benefits associ-
ated with decentralization. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
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First, federalism "increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes" by locating decision making authority in mul-
tiple, smaller units of government.213 Second, federalism operates as
"a check on abuses of government power" by distributing power
among various sovereigns. 214 Finally, interstate competition over regu-
latory authority produces better policies, particularly when citizens
can "vote with their feet" by moving from state to state.215 Competi-
tion creates incentives for state-level decision makers to tailor policies
to fit local circumstances and preferences. Because "preferences for
government policies are unevenly distributed among the various local-
ities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision making
than by a single national authority. '216 Regulatory competition also
permits states to experiment with innovative policies,217 serving-as
Justice Brandeis famously put it-as "laborator[ies]" for the rest of
the country.218
1. Promoting Democracy
The first justification for decentralized power-promoting par-
ticipatory democracy-translates easily from regulation to enforce-
ment. Enforcement has significant practical effects on the lives of
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994) (questioning value of
federalism). I assume for purposes of this discussion that federalism is (or at least can be) a
good thing and ask whether decentralized enforcement produces the same sorts of conse-
quences as decentralized regulatory authority. In the next Section, I identify the circum-
stances under which those consequences are desirable from the perspective of the federal
system.
213 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also Deborah J. Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 7 (1988) ("The greater accessibility and smaller scale of local government allows individ-
uals to participate actively in governmental decision making.").
214 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
215 Cf Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418 (1956) ("[T]he consumer-voter moves to that community whose local government best
satisfies his set of preferences. The greater the number of communities and the greater the
variance among them, the closer [he] will come to fully realizing his preference position.").
As others have recognized, there is good reason to question the premise of citizen mobility
that underlies the metaphor of voting with one's feet. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Feder-
alism, 82 MiNN. L. REv. 317, 387-88 (1997) ("People can and do move, but inertia is a
large factor in why each of us lives where we do. Even when moves occur, they tend to be
for reasons largely unrelated to government policy decisions: We move because our work
takes us elsewhere, or because of marriage or some other personal need, or perhaps
because of climate and health."). As noted, supra note 212, my aim here is not to make the
case for traditional defenses of federalism, but to investigate whether they make sense
when applied to state enforcement rather than state regulation.
216 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Framers' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1484, 1493 (1987).
217 Id. at 1498-1500.
218 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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citizens. As such, it is an important site for democratic input.219 By
authorizing enforcement by state attorneys general as well as a federal
agency, Congress enhances citizens' ability to influence public
enforcement of federal law. State enforcers may be more accessible
and responsive than federal agencies, both because states are smaller
units of government and because state attorneys general tend to be
elected rather than appointed. To the extent that federal agencies are
accountable to the people, it is by virtue of their relationship with
elected officials such as the President.220 State enforcement removes
the middleman.22 '
State enforcement of federal law also opens up additional chan-
nels for democratic input within the state. As noted above, federal
statutes can and sometimes do empower state attorneys general to
enforce rules that state legislatures could have created under state law
but did not. In these areas, federal policy makers have recognized the
value of state-level treatment of an issue, but state regulators have not
acted. At first blush, such statutes may seem pernicious from a feder-
alism perspective, as they override the state's preference for inaction.
However, attention to enforcement as a distinct form of state
authority underscores the importance of breaking open the black box
that represents "the state" to reveal the diverse group of state actors
within. 222 Independently elected attorneys general may represent dif-
219 See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
1325,1339 (1993) ("If someone is to decide which laws will be aggressively enforced, which
laws will be enforced occasionally, and which laws will never be enforced, it makes sense
that the person who has to answer to the voters will make those determinations.").
Scholars have made similar arguments about local prosecutors. See, e.g., Daniel C.
Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83
VA. L. REV. 939, 961 (1997) ("[S]ome formal mechanism is thought necessary to ensure
that the 'people' have a voice in how [prosecutors] deploy[ ] resources in their name."); see
also Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 57 (1998) ("[T]he current system of choosing state and local prose-
cutors through the electoral process was established for the purpose of holding prosecutors
accountable to the people they serve.").
220 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2332
(2001) ("[P]residential leadership establishes an electoral link between the public and the
bureaucracy, increasing the latter's responsiveness to the former."); Matthew C.
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MicH. L. REV. 53, 68 (2008)
("While bureaucratic policy preferences are not directly responsive to voter interests, the
president-who is responsive to voter interests, at least in expectation-has a number of
tools at her disposal to shift the bureaucracy's ideal point.").
221 Cf Marshall, supra note 8, at 2475-76 (arguing that independent, directly elected
federal attorney general would better serve goals of accountability and transparency).
222 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law To Free State
and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1201, 1201 (1999)
("In discussions about American federalism, it is common to speak of a 'state government'
as if it were a black box, an individual speaking with a single voice .... [A] 'state' actually
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ferent constituencies than other elected state officials because of polit-
ical differences, and they may "hear" different citizen voices because
of the distinctive ways their offices are set up to gather and respond to
citizen complaints. As a result, state attorneys general may pursue ini-
tiatives that the legislature and the governor either overlook or
affirmatively reject.
This is a virtue of the existing system, not a vice. 223 To begin with,
the failure of the state legislature to adopt a particular rule is not reli-
able evidence of legislative intent. There are many reasons why legis-
lation may not be enacted even if a majority of legislators and their
constituents favor it.224 Indeed, the legislature may not even have con-
sidered the rule in question. But enforcement by the attorney general
may be appropriate even if it were clear that a majority of state legis-
lators would vote against the relevant federal rule. State law recog-
nizes various representatives in the judicial, legislative, and executive
branches of state government-including the attorney general.
Absent some indication from state law, there is no a priori reason to
favor state legislatures as the "real" representatives of the states'
citizens.
In any event, the attorney general's authority to enforce federal
law is best understood as a default rule that the state legislature could
change, either by foreclosing any state enforcement of federal law or
by designating a different state actor as the authorized enforcer. Some
federal statutes are explicit in this respect, stating that attorneys gen-
eral can sue on behalf of the state unless the state enacts contrary
legislation.225 Those statutes reverse the preexisting default, under
incorporates a bundle of different subdivisions, branches, and agencies ...."); Resnik et
al., supra note 93, at 728 ("States are themselves aggregates of entities and of persons
holding different (and sometimes conflicting) views of what constitutes that state's
'interest.'").
223 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 76, at 1273 n.45 ("[A]scribing various state
officials' actions to the state itself highlights that many different actors can speak on behalf
of the state. This diversity generates more channels for state dissent against federal policy
and may be particularly important in the context of what we call the 'administrative safe-
guards of federalism,' where the state 'administrators' of federal policy include not just
bureaucrats, but legislators and executives as well.").
224 Cf Lemos, supra note 79, at 460 (discussing possible barriers to congressional
action).
225 Federal antitrust law is an example. See 15 U.S.C. § 15h (2006) (stating that provision
for state parens patriae enforcement authority "shall apply in any State, unless such State
provides by law for its nonapplicability in such State"). Other statutes specify the attorney
general as the default state enforcer but make clear that states could empower different
state actors. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 5712(g)(2) (2006) (permitting other state actors author-
ized by State and FTC to enforce federal regulations governing pay-per-call services); 15
U.S.C. § 7706(f)(1) (2006) (authorizing enforcement of federal anti-spain legislation by
"the attorney general, official, or agency of the state"); 47 U.S.C. § 227(f)(1) (2006)
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which the legislature's failure to act also forecloses enforcement by
the attorney general. Such a reversal seems entirely proper when the
citizens' federal representatives and their attorney general have both
deemed the issue important enough to warrant action. Given that
state enforcement provisions appear primarily in federal statutes
designed to protect consumers, the targets of state enforcement are
likely to be business interests that are capable of making themselves
heard in the state legislature should the need arise. By shifting the
burden of inertia onto such groups, federal law can help promote
democratic debate at the state level, ensuring that a statewide policy
in favor of nonenforcement is made by the citizens' representatives
(either the attorney general or the legislature) rather than by
default.226
2. Preventing Tyranny and Abuse
Things become more complicated when we move to the second of
the traditional defenses of federalism: preventing tyranny. As the
Supreme Court has explained, "[jiust as the separation and indepen-
dence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front. ' 227 Whether the same argument can be applied to enforcement
depends, in large part, on how one defines "tyranny and abuse."
Enforcement authority creates a state-level check against under-
enforcement by federal agencies.228 Thus, if the federal government
ignores certain violations for illegitimate reasons-targeting
Republicans but not Democrats, for example, or African Americans
but not Caucasians-the states can level the playing field through
their own enforcement efforts. States can provide a similar corrective
for underenforcement by other states. And the potential for such gap-
filling by individual states should reduce the likelihood of nonenforce-
ment at the outset.229
(authorizing enforcement of federal common carrier legislation by attorney general "or an
official or agency designated by a State").
226 Cf Hills, supra note 222, at 1248-49 (defending presumption against federal pre-
emption on ground that it encourages Congress to confront issues and "in effect delegat[es
the] solution to interest groups seeking national action, who must make the case before
Congress for express intervention in state political structure").
227 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
228 See Widman, supra note 9, at 176-77 (explaining that enforcement authority enables
states to step in when federal agencies fail to enforce).
229 Similarly, the availability of both state and federal enforcement enables federal
enforcers to provide a corrective against underenforcement by states. Just as federal law
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Note, however, that the ratchet only moves in one direction:
toward more enforcement. 230 States can increase enforcement,
thereby reducing the risk of discriminatory nonenforcement and
underdeterrence. But state enforcement does not create an effective
check against abusive overenforcement by the federal government or
other states. Each state can forgo enforcement itself, but it cannot pre-
vent other enforcers from acting.
This problem is not unique to enforcement authority. For
example, states lack the power to repeal the federal ban on marijuana
possession, even if their own laws permit such possession for medical
purposes.231 Nevertheless, the presence of more permissive state laws
can exert a powerful influence on public opinion-and, by extension,
on federal decision makers.232
The same can be said of enforcement. States can object to federal
enforcement practices through private communications with federal
agencies or in public statements, press releases, and amicus briefs. Of
course, states can voice such objections regardless of whether they are
empowered to enforce the relevant law. Yet the fact that a state
attorney general has authority to enforce federal law in a given cir-
cumstance, but has chosen not to do so, lends a certain gravitas to
state-based objections. The existence of enforcement authority both
validates states' connection to the statute and permits state enforcers
to gain the expertise necessary for their enforcement decisions to be
taken seriously.
may sometimes set a floor for state regulatory action, see supra note 74 and accompanying
text, federal enforcement efforts establish a baseline level of enforcement that states are
free to exceed. One could imagine a scenario, however, in which states had exclusive
enforcement authority, serving as replacements for rather than supplements to federal
agencies. Indeed, although every statute that currently authorizes state enforcement also
empowers a federal agency enforcer, it may be the case that as a practical matter states are
the only real enforcers in certain areas. Where states' enforcement powers are legally or
functionally exclusive, the one-way ratchet problem discussed in the text below largely
disappears-but it is replaced by heightened concerns about the possibility of under-
enforcement by states.
230 See Posner, supra note 9, at 259 (discussing "one-way character" of state antitrust
enforcement).
231 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (upholding federal prohibition on mari-
juana possession even as applied to persons who had obtained marijuana legally under
California law for therapeutic use).
232 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Announces Formal Medical
Marijuana Guidelines (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/
October/09-ag-1119.html (discussing federal enforcement guidelines that "make clear that
the focus of federal resources should not be on individuals whose actions are in compliance
with existing state laws"); see also Merritt, supra note 213, at 5-6 (arguing that state gov-
ernments can check federal authority through lobbying, litigation, and "by serving as a
wellspring of political force," even though they "can neither veto federal legislation nor
declare it unconstitutional").
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3. Improving Policy
The next set of arguments for federalism focuses on the policy
benefits of decentralized decision making. The conditions in
Montana-social, political, economic, agricultural, and so forth-are
different from the conditions in Florida, and state actors are better
positioned than national legislators or bureaucrats to appreciate the
fine points. State law, moreover, "can be adapted to local conditions
and local tastes, while a national government must take a uniform-
and hence less desirable-approach. ' 233 Citizens can choose among
the resulting policy packages by moving from state to state, opting for
the one that best fits their preferences. 234 And states, which compete
with each other for "productive assets" and "desirable people," have
incentives to create attractive policies. 235 The upshot is that federalism
offers a way to satisfy more citizen preferences than does centralized
national rule.
State enforcement captures some of these benefits of decentral-
ized regulatory authority. Citizens of different states may have dif-
ferent tastes for enforcement, and state enforcement can reflect those
variations. Similarly, a local perspective may inform state enforcers'
interpretations of federal law, generating different approaches in dif-
ferent states and at the federal level. And state enforcers' familiarity
with local conditions enables them to identify violations that their fed-
eral counterparts might miss. As with regulation, therefore, state
enforcement authority can help match enforcement policy to the pref-
erences of local citizens.
Although a "citizen choice" justification for state enforcement
has significant appeal, it is important not to overstate the case. One
limitation is the one-way-ratchet problem identified above. While
enforcement allows for some variation from state to state, states will
find it difficult to satisfy the preferences of citizens who would prefer
little or no enforcement, because they cannot prevent other states or
the federal government from stepping in. Jurisdictional limitations
may preclude states from using state law to reach out-of-state defen-
dants, but those limitations evaporate when states are empowered to
enforce federal law. This factor-often emphasized by states as an
argument in favor of state enforcement provisions in federal stat-
utes236-reduces the value of enforcement authority as a vehicle for
citizen choice. A second difficulty with the "citizen choice" rationale is
233 McConnell, supra note 216, at 1493.
234 For the classic statement of this claim, see Tiebout, supra note 215, at 418.
235 Rubin & Feeley, supra note 212, at 920.
236 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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that the effects of state enforcement frequently spill over state lines.
The decisions of one or a few states can effectively shape policy
nationwide by generating judicial decisions that limit the range of
enforcement choices going forward, inspiring a change in federal law
or enforcement practices, or influencing private behavior.237
Again, these critiques are not limited to enforcement but apply
with equal force to regulation. One state's demanding labeling
requirements may affect products nationwide, and another state's lax
environmental standards may increase pollution in neighboring states.
Bigger and more powerful states may have an advantage over smaller
states in these respects,238 which raises concerns about "horizontal
aggrandizement. '239 The key point for present purposes is that state
enforcement authority-like state regulatory authority-has the
potential to improve citizen choice, not that it always will.
Finally, state enforcement can function as a "laboratory,"
allowing states to "try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country. ' 240 Concededly, states' experiments
with enforcement will not always be confined within state boundaries.
State enforcement that affects out-of-staters by changing judicial
interpretations of federal law nationwide, or by inducing regulated
entities to alter their behavior, does not occur "without risk to the rest
of the country." But not all interstate effects are incompatible with the
concept of states as laboratories. On the contrary, the theory assumes
that successful state experiments will often be adopted at the national
level.241 To the extent that experience with state enforcement per-
suades federal agencies to change their own enforcement practices-
as may have been the case with FTC's approach to monetary remedies
237 See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
238 See BRANN, supra note 90, at 9 ("As a practical matter, a relatively small number of
States, which were usually larger states with greater resources, end up running most of the
[multistate] Executive Committees.").
239 Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 955-56 (2001) ("[T]he federal political process threatens state
autonomy insofar as that process is the means by which a majority of states may impose
their own policy preferences on a minority of states with different preferences.").
240 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.").
241 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 77 (1995) ("[A] policy that may
begin its development at the national level ... [may] assume a different complexion and
shape in every state in which it is administered. Ultimately, the experiences of the range of
states will reflect back on, and redefine, the policy itself." (discussing DANIEL J. ELAZAR,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEw FROM THE STATES (2d ed. 1972)).
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in competition cases, for example 242-state enforcement fits neatly
with this famous justification for federalism.
An additional epistemic benefit of state enforcement of federal
law is that it provides opportunities for experimentation with respect
to the institutions of enforcement themselves. Concurrent enforce-
ment authority means that there are more than fifty governmental
agencies capable of enforcing a given federal rule at any time. Those
state and federal agencies differ along various axes, including their
size, resources, degree of specialization, transparency, political affilia-
tion, and so on.243 Thus, divergent enforcement practices by various
states and a federal agency generate useful information not only about
possible policy approaches, but also about possible ways to structure
public enforcement. 244
From the perspective of federalism, therefore, state enforcement
shares many important features in common with state regulation.
Both types of state authority provide opportunities for democratic
input, check abuses by the federal government, improve the range of
citizen choice, and create valuable information about different
approaches to the use of government power. Although state regula-
tion has received the lion's share of attention to date, state enforce-
ment authority deserves consideration as an additional site for
decentralized decision making.
B. Assessing Interstate Variation in Enforcement
I have argued that state enforcement authority can advance the
project of federalism, generating many of the same benefits of decen-
tralized decision making that state regulation provides. Yet decentral-
ized decision making is not always a force for the good. Few scholars
argue that "state regulation per se adds value to national policy. '245
Instead, most recognize that state regulation will be advantageous in
some instances and not in others. 246 Where decentralized regulatory
242 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
243 See BRANN, supra note 90, at 3-7 (discussing differences in state attorney general
consumer protection divisions, with consequences for states' emphasis on mediation or
settlement versus litigation, their pursuit of "impact litigation," and their preference for
seeking damages or injunctive relief).
244 See First, Statement, supra note 115, at 11 ("Comparing how different agencies
handle similar problems is a way of overcoming informational asymmetries. [Legislators]
can better judge whether agencies are bringing enough of the right kinds of cases or are
operating efficiently.").
245 Metzger, supra note 76, at 2099-2100.
246 See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A
General Theory of Article 1, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. Rnv. 115 (2010) (offering functional
explanation for Constitution's division of power between federal government and states by
showing that federal regulation is preferred when states face collective action problems).
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authority is likely to result in parochialism or set off a destructive race
to the bottom, for example, a national solution is appropriate even if it
means sacrificing state creativity.247
Like state regulation, state enforcement may promote state inter-
ests at the expense of the broader public interest. Indeed, state
enforcement may be problematic precisely because it is different from
federal enforcement. Legislators and industry groups opposed to state
enforcement frequently cite the specter of "50 different interpreta-
tions of federal law,"' 248 creating a "confusing patchwork" 249 of
requirements that "complicate the compliance obligations of legiti-
mate businesses who operate in a regional or multi-State environ-
ment. '250 In areas where uniformity is particularly important, the
costs of interstate variation may well outweigh the benefits.
247 See Hills, supra note 77, at 5 ("Congress frequently regulates activities because state
regulation, or lack of regulation, of those activities imposes external costs on neighboring
states. The whole point of the federal scheme is to suppress states' creativity, which might
consist only of creatively achieving benefits for their own citizens at the expense of
nonresidents.").
248 S. 1462, The Automated Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; S. 1410, The
Telephone Advertising Consumer Protection Act; and S. 857, Equal Billing for Long Dis-
tance Charges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commc'ns of the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci., and Transp., 102d Cong. 40 (1991) (statement of Richard A. Barton, Senior Vice Pres-
ident, Government Affairs, Direct Marketing Association).
249 154 CONG. REC. S7871 (daily ed. July 31, 2008) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl)
(regarding Consumer Products Safety Improvement Act: "Giving 50 attorneys general dis-
cretion over consumer product safety laws would lead to 50 different interpretations of the
law, and, thus, a confusing patchwork of safety standards that would make it more difficult
for the CPSC to enforce uniform, national policies.").
250 Telemarketing Fraud and Consumer Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Transp. and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong.
79 (1991) (statement of Michael J. Altier, Vice President, National Retail Federation); see
also Consumer Product Safety Commission Reauthorization (Part 2): Hearing on H. R. 3343
and H.R. 3443 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Prot., and Competitiveness
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 121 (1987) (statement of James
Lacy, General Counsel, Consumer Product Safety Commission) ("I think the problem is
the fact that it is not quite so simple when you have 50 different attorneys general looking
at one law and you have a national Consumer Product Safety Commission which is pur-
portedly setting a uniform consumer product safety environment."); id. at 340 (statement
of National Electrical Manufacturers Association) ("Manufacturers' attempts to anticipate
and comply with CPSC requirements will be frustrated if the Commission's decisions about
the safety of individual products can be second-guessed by state officials and reexamined
and modified by the courts."); Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearing on H.R. 10285
Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and Credit of the H. Comm. on Agric., 95th Cong.
287 (1978) (statement of Laurence Rosenberg, Chairman, Chicago Mercantile Exchange)
(arguing that federal agency must have exclusive jurisdiction "so that the industry can be
held responsible for one uniform set of requirements. The same reasons which make us
unalterably opposed to a division of federal responsibility over futures apply even more
strongly to a sharing of authority between federal and state agencies. Such a division of
authority would raise the specter of 50 different and possibly conflicting interpretations of
the many provision of the CFTC Act." (emphases omitted)).
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State enforcement also may be undesirable in areas where the
optimal level of enforcement lies somewhere below maximum
enforcement. Overenforcement is possible in any enforcement regime,
but the risk is particularly pressing in areas where the relevant liability
rule is written in broad terms, capturing conduct that law makers "did
not in fact want to forbid. ' 251 A federal agency with a monopoly on
enforcement could engage in "discretionary non-enforcement" by
ignoring certain technical violations in favor of others it deems more
important.252 But that strategy will not work when enforcement
authority is scattered among fifty different enforcers, with no mecha-
nism for centralized control. And decentralized enforcement will tend
toward more rather than less enforcement because of the one-way
ratchet effect discussed above. While states can make up for under-
enforcement by other states or the federal government by increasing
their own efforts, no state can prevent another from enforcing in any
given instance.
States may be particularly prone to overenforcement, moreover,
due to the self-financing nature of some state enforcement schemes
and the states' ability to export the costs of enforcement to other
states. State enforcers may be too quick to go after out-of-state defen-
dants, since many of the ultimate costs of enforcement (for example,
lost jobs or higher prices) will be borne by nonresidents. 253 Political
ambitions may also encourage attorneys general to adopt a more
entrepreneurial and aggressive brand of enforcement than typically is
observed at the federal enforcement agencies.
It is impossible to determine in the abstract when interstate varia-
tion in enforcement will "add[] value to national policy" 254-or, in
other words, when the benefits of state-level decision making will out-
weigh the potential costs of disuniformity and overenforcement.
Striking the correct balance requires answering a series of context-
specific empirical questions regarding the actual practices of state,
federal, and private enforcers and the effects of enforcement on regu-
lated entities. Perhaps more importantly, reasonable minds will often
disagree on what the "right" answer is. For example, one who
believes, as a policy matter, that dangers to children's health should be
251 Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 38.
252 Id.
253 See Posner, supra note 9, at 257-58 (voicing this concern regarding state antitrust
enforcement). But see Greve, supra note 9, at 103-04 (showing that state antitrust
enforcers frequently pursue in-state defendants); Himes, supra note 195, at 10 (empha-
sizing former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's "willingness to take on home-
grown business interests").
254 Metzger, supra note 76, at 2099-2100).
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avoided at all costs will not be concerned by the possibility that states
might take an aggressive approach to enforcing the CPSIA's ban on
phthalates, whereas one who is committed to fostering small business
will see a greater risk of excessive state enforcement. Similarly, one's
assessment of whether state-to-state variation in enforcement reflects
valuable localism or parochial interference with national policy will
depend heavily on one's view of the merits of the national policy at
issue. Those who broadly support the policy will not be troubled by
the possibility that some states will enforce it more stringently than
the federal agency, whereas those who deem it critical to cabin the
national policy carefully will see creative state enforcement in a dif-
ferent light.
It should come as no surprise, then, that existing debates about
state enforcement-both in Congress and in academic commentary-
tend to conflate critiques (or defenses) of the substance of the
relevant federal law with critiques (or defenses) of state enforce-
ment.255 That approach is understandable, but it is not inevitable. A
trans-substantive analysis of state enforcement of federal law reveals
several recurring considerations that bear on the risks of disuniformity
and overenforcement. As the remainder of this Part will show, the
significance of those risks hinges on three common factors: the status
of state law, the role of federal courts and agencies, and the nature of
the federal rule to be enforced. While the desirability of state enforce-
ment in any area will depend on both objective empirical fact and
subjective policy judgment, attention to the factors highlighted here
will sharpen the inquiry-and will make clear that concerns about dis-
uniformity and overenforcement can be accommodated in many cases
while leaving meaningful room for state participation in the enforce-
ment of federal law.
1. Disuniformity
State enforcement of federal law is easiest to defend against
charges of disuniformity in areas where states also can enact and
enforce their own laws. Many federal statutes that provide for state
enforcement do not purport to preempt state law on the subject.2 56
255 See supra text accompanying note 68.
256 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1203(b) (2006) (permitting states to adopt standards governing
flammable fabrics that are more stringent than federal rules); 15 U.S.C. § 6313 (2006)
(same, for rules governing boxing matches); 15 U.S.C. § 7806 (2006) (disclaiming intent to
preempt state law regulating sports agents); 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(3) (2006) (same, for state
law regulating access to abortion clinics); 49 U.S.C. § 14711(f) (2006) (same, for state crim-
inal law regarding transportation of household goods); see also California v. ARC America
Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1989) (explaining that "the Court has recognized that the fed-
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Congress's decision to permit state law making (and enforcement of
state law) reflects a judgment that the benefits of decentralized deci-
sion making outweigh the possible costs to uniformity. That judgment
may of course be mistaken-that is, there may be state laws that
ought to be preempted but currently are not-but it would be odd to
identify state enforcement of federal law as the primary target of
reform in those areas. Where disuniformity is a problem, the effects of
fifty different approaches to enforcing federal law will pale in compar-
ison to the effects of fifty different approaches to enforcing fifty dif-
ferent laws. 257
Although the costs of state enforcement of federal law are min-
imal in areas where states can make and enforce their own laws, the
benefits are still present. By authorizing states to enforce federal law,
Congress can harness state enforcers' local perspectives in the devel-
opment and application of federal law. Similarly, state enforcement of
federal law provides rare opportunities for insight into possible
enforcement strategies, as citizens and policy makers can compare the
efforts of more than fifty government institutions that have authority
to enforce the same rule. Competition in public enforcement also
reduces the likelihood that powerful offenders will be able to escape
eral antitrust laws do not pre-empt state law" and refusing to preempt state laws permitting
suit by indirect purchasers, though such actions are foreclosed under federal law).
257 That is not to say that state enforcement of federal law poses no risk to uniformity
above and beyond that created by a failure to preempt state law. The Microsoft antitrust
litigation, which sparked a wave of commentary critical of state antitrust enforcement,
illustrates the potential problem. In 1998, the United States and a group of states filed
suit against Microsoft alleging antitrust violations. See Welcome, COORDINATED STATE
ENFORCEMENT OF MICRosoFr ANTITRUST JUDGMENTS, http://www.microsoft-
antitrust.gov/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (describing background of case and providing
helpful links). Efforts to mediate the dispute broke down in the face of disagreements
between some of the states and the Department of Justice over the appropriate remedy.
First, supra note 9, at 1033-34. It is unclear whether the states should be faulted for the
breakdown in Microsoft, or whether the problem (if it is one) has repeated itself elsewhere.
Id. Nevertheless, the experience suggests how states' involvement in litigation can compli-
cate federal enforcement efforts-a risk that does not occur when states can enforce only
state law.
The important point for present purposes is that federal policy makers have tools to
combat such interference while preserving state enforcement. Most federal statutes that
authorize enforcement by state attorneys general contain provisions that effectively grant
federal officials a right of first refusal on enforcement actions. States must give federal
enforcers prior notice of any proposed enforcement action and are precluded from pro-
ceeding against a defendant for violations that are the subject of a pending federal action.
Those provisions do not appear in the federal antitrust statutes. If indeed state interference
with federal antitrust enforcement is a recurring phenomenon, it may be appropriate to
cabin state enforcement through equivalent notice and pending-federal-action provisions.
See also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 941
(2001) (arguing that Justice Department should have "right of first refusal" to bring anti-
trust suits, thereby preempting state and private actions).
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penalties for federal violations by exerting influence on a single
responsible agency, 258 and can spur both state and federal enforcers to
act more forcefully and efficiently.259 And state enforcement of fed-
eral law may be significantly more efficient than the alternative-
enforcement of state law-because multiple states can sue together in
one federal court rather than filing duplicative actions in separate
state courts.
The harder question is whether state enforcement of federal law
can be justified on federalism grounds in areas where state law is-or
ought to be-preempted.2 60 One might reasonably conclude that
state-level variations in the enforcement of federal law will always be
undesirable in such circumstances, since a decision to preempt state
law suggests the need for a uniform national policy. 261 That view has
some force, but it ignores important differences between regulation
and enforcement. Here the relative weakness of enforcement
authority becomes a strength. When states take a divergent approach
to enforcement of federal law, they are simply expressing a view on
how to interpret and apply a rule that was adopted by Congress or a
federal agency. The range of possible outcomes may be quite broad,
but it is narrower than if states were free to adopt and enforce dif-
ferent rules. State-to-state variation, then, is necessarily cabined.
Congress can further reduce the risk of disuniformity by giving
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over state enforcement actions.
Channeling state enforcement through the federal courts helps ensure
that the law develops in a coherent fashion. To see the importance of
federal-court control, consider what we know about so-called
"mirror" statutes-state statutes that replicate federal law but are
enforced by states and private parties in state courts. For example,
many states have enacted "little FTC Acts" that mirror the language
of the federal act prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" 262
and specify that "due consideration ... shall be given" to the FTC's
258 Cf Richman, supra note 78, at 780-82 (arguing that fragmented prosecutorial
authority reduces risk of capture).
259 Cf. Katyal, supra note 80, at 2324-27 (discussing benefits of competition among fed-
eral agencies with overlapping jurisdictions).
260 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (listing statutes that authorize state
enforcement while preempting state law); see also Widman, supra note 9, at 207 ("A state
enforcement power is sometimes created in exchange for absolute preemption of state
laws, as in the Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2009 and the Fair Credit and
Reporting Act of 2003." (citing Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong.
(2009), and Fair Credit and Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006), amended by
FACTA Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159 (2003))).
261 See Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory
Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 20-22 (2000) (detailing inefficiencies that
can result from preemptable state law).
262 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
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and federal courts' interpretations of federal law.263 Despite the simi-
larity in the relevant statutory commands, the state statutes have
drifted away from the federal model. The prohibition on "unfair"
practices provides a ready illustration. In 1980, the FTC adopted an
interpretation of the federal statute that keyed unfairness to a cost-
benefit analysis focused on "unjustified consumer injury" 264-an
interpretation that was later endorsed by the federal courts265 and
Congress.266 Meanwhile, states and private parties acting under state
law persuaded state courts to adopt divergent interpretations of
unfairness, and to reach an increasingly wide range of conduct
"adjudged unfair under current commercial mores. '267 As a result of
that judicial gloss, many state "mirror" statutes today bear little
resemblance to their federal reflection. 268
A final factor that bears on the potential for disuniformity is the
breadth of the relevant federal rule. While many federal statutes are
written in sweeping terms, that is not always the case-as the phtha-
lates ban discussed in the previous Part demonstrates. 269 And much
state enforcement of federal law entails enforcement of agency regula-
tions, which on the whole tend to be more specific than the statutes
that inspire them. The few scholars who have taken notice of state
enforcement have focused primarily on antitrust law.270 But antitrust
is an extreme and unusual example, not only because of the breadth of
the relevant statutory language, but also because it is an area where
no federal agency has the authority to adopt binding regulations clari-
263 See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really
Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 169-73 (internal quotation marks omitted).
264 J. Howard Beales, 111, The Federal Trade Commission's Use of Unfairness Authority:
Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, 22 J. Pus. POL'Y & MKTG, 192, 194 (2003).
265 E.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FrC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1988).
266 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) (codifying FTC's policy statement by denying Commission
authority to declare act unlawful on unfairness grounds "unless the act or practice causes
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition").
267 Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product
Safety Net: Using State Unfair Practices Laws To Make Handguns and Other Consumer
Goods Safer, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 285 (2000).
268 See Michael M. Greenfield, Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its
Impact on State Law, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1869, 1929 (2000) (explaining that although
"courts in most states pay lip service to the statutory direction that they 'be guided by'
interpretations of [federal law], ...in fact they adhere to pre-1980 articulations" of
unfairness).
269 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. The phthalates ban preempts state law on
the subject. See Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act Frequently Asked Questions,
CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, http://www.cpsc.gov/about/cpsia/faq/231faq.html#ql
(last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
270 See, e.g., supra note 9.
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fying the statutory text.271 That scenario is not unique, but it is fairly
rare.272 To return to the FTC example above, the FTC Act's prohibi-
tion of "unfair" practices is quite broad. The FTC's interpretation of
the prohibition, embodied in the 1980 Policy Statement and later codi-
fied in the statute,273 is far more limited. Should state attorneys gen-
eral be given authority to enforce the FTC Act in federal court (as
NAAG has suggested 274), they would be constrained by the FTC's
interpretations and by the body of case law that has developed in
response to FTC enforcement efforts. Both limitations differentiate
state enforcement of federal law from state enforcement of state law
and help explain why the former may be tolerable even when the
latter is preempted.
In sum, state enforcement authority need not entail a significant
amount of interpretive discretion. Concerns about disuniformity
recede when states are called upon to enforce a relatively precise fed-
eral statute or regulation.275 Such enforcement authority represents a
way to secure the values of local knowledge and citizen input even in
areas where it is important to have a uniform substantive rule. States
that wish to increase the level of enforcement over the federal base-
line can devote their own resources to the effort and can experiment
with different approaches, but the law's core prescription remains the
same.
2. Overenforcement
Much of the foregoing discussion applies with equal force to the
question of overenforcement. As with disuniformity, concerns about
overenforcement do not justify jettisoning state enforcement of fed-
271 it bears emphasis that antitrust is also an area where state law is not preempted. See
supra note 256. Moreover, even if state antitrust law were preempted and states were pro-
hibited from enforcing federal antitrust law, federal law would still permit private antitrust
suits and divide federal enforcement authority between the FTC and the antitrust division
of the DOJ. Thus, while the risk of disuniformity may be particularly stark in the antitrust
context, given the breadth of the relevant federal rule, it is far from clear that states'
authority to enforce federal law is the root of the problem. Other contributing factors,
including the splintering of federal enforcement authority, the availability of private rights
of action, and the continued validity of divergent state laws, are at least as important-and
probably more so.
272 See Lemos, supra note 79, at 429-30 & n.122 (discussing statutes that vest primary
interpretive authority in federal courts rather than agencies).
273 See supra note 266 (citing statute codifying FTC's policy statement).
274 Cole, supra note 197, at 134.
275 This analysis helps make sense of an otherwise puzzling provision of the recent
Dodd-Frank financial overhaul bill, which prohibits states from enforcing any "provision of
this title" against a national bank or federal savings association but permits states to
enforce, against the same institutions, "a regulation prescribed by the [newly created
Consumer Financial Protection] Bureau under a provision of this title." Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1042(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012-13 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552).
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eral law in areas where state law is not preempted. If socially valuable
activity will be deterred by overly aggressive enforcement, state
enforcement of federal law seems significantly less threatening than
states' ability to create and enforce legal standards that are stricter
than the federal model. Again, the more challenging case for state
enforcement is where state attorneys general disrupt what would oth-
erwise be a federal monopoly on public enforcement. And again, the
risk of overenforcement in that context expands and contracts with
the breadth of the federal rule being enforced. When state enforce-
ment is confined to federal court-and particularly when it is linked to
agency regulations-the possibility that state enforcers will target
behavior that federal policy makers have condoned is significantly
reduced.
Interstate variations in the intensity of enforcement may still be
problematic if the federal agency has made a considered decision
about how to secure the optimal level of deterrence and state enforce-
ment will push over that line. But that is a big "if." The same features
that make states more prone to overenforcement than federal agen-
cies also suggest that state enforcement will be less likely to result in
underenforcement than a federal monopoly on enforcement. Consider
the consumer-protection field, the most common site for state
enforcement provisions. Attorneys general will have varying incen-
tives regarding enforcement, depending on local conditions and their
own commitments. But protecting constituents from harm-whether
defined as unsafe products or internet spain or unfair lending prac-
tices or elder fraud-is likely to rank high on any ambitious attorney
general's list of priorities. And many statutes that authorize state
enforcement of federal consumer-protection law permit states to
recover damages for their citizens, which may strengthen their incen-
tive to act. In short, consumer protection statutes are likely candidates
for aggressive state enforcement. Whether that is a problem depends
on a variety of context-specific considerations, including the optimal
level of enforcement and the level of enforcement already provided
by federal agencies.276 Most consumer protection statutes with provi-
sions for state enforcement fall within the jurisdiction of either the
CPSC or the FTC. As Amy Widman has shown, the history of the
CPSC has been one of "massive regulatory failure. ' 277 And the FTC,
276 See Shavell, Fundamental Divergence, supra note 13, at 586-87 (discussing difficul-
ties in determining optimal level of enforcement); see also Rose, supra note 9, at 2178-92
(analyzing over- and underdeterrence in securities context).
277 Widman, supra note 9, at 184; see also Consumer Product Safety Commission Fre-
quently Asked Questions, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, http://www.cpsc.gov/about/
faq.html#rep (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) ("We receive about 10,000 reports of product-
related injuries and deaths a year from consumers and others. Due to our small staff size,
we can investigate only a few of them.").
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"although one of the smallest administrative agencies,... is charged
with policing an enormous amount of activity. '278 Empirical research
is necessary to answer the question conclusively, but the existing
record does not suggest an imminent risk of overenforcement of all or
even most federal consumer protection law.279
On the other hand, state enforcement may be less prone to over-
enforcement than the other alternative: private enforcement. States
are more likely than private parties to coordinate effectively with fed-
eral enforcers. Coordination is made possible not only by the limited
number of state enforcers but also by existing relationships that lay
the groundwork for negotiations between state and federal enforcers.
Coordination is further encouraged by statutory provisions that both
require states to notify their federal counterparts about enforcement
actions and permit intervention by the relevant federal agency.280
Effective state-federal cooperation is by no means inevitable, as the
previous Part explained. 281 Nevertheless, the web of ties between
attorneys general and their "federal partners" 282 creates a kind of
friction against state-federal conflict and overenforcement by
states.283
More crucially, state attorneys general face resource constraints
that limit the scope of possible enforcement actions. Fifty state attor-
neys general comprise a relatively small group. Even if each state
takes an aggressive approach to enforcement, the volume of litigation
will almost certainly be smaller than private plaintiffs would generate.
And while both state and private enforcement can create negative
externalities, state enforcers represent a wider range of interests and
can internalize more of the costs of enforcement. I argued in the pre-
vious Part that state enforcers may benefit in various ways from finan-
cial recoveries. 284 Yet they lack the immediate monetary stake in
litigation that private parties and their attorneys enjoy. State enforce-
ment may therefore operate as a compromise between federal and
private enforcement-a way to intensify enforcement above the level
278 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 544 n.6 (2008).
279 Cf First, Statement, supra note 115, at 2 ("Although the data themselves cannot
show whether there is state under- or over-enforcement [of federal antitrust law], the rela-
tively small number of state cases, coupled with a lack of enforcement resources, leads me
to believe that under-enforcement is the more likely conclusion, particularly given the size
of the U.S. economy to be policed by antitrust enforcement agencies.").
280 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
282 See Federal Partners, NAT'L Ass'N OF Arr'ys GEN., http://www.naag. org/
federal-partners.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (listing federal agencies).
283 Federal policy makers could further reduce the risk of overenforcement by states by
foreclosing multistate actions. See supra note 198 (citing examples of coordinated state
enforcement actions).
284 See supra Part II.A.4.
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provided by the federal agency without opening the floodgates
entirely.
To see the potential value of state enforcement as a compromise
mechanism, consider the federal CAN-SPAM Act, which prohibits
various forms of email spam.285 Spam is annoying, but it is surprisingly
difficult to pin down exactly how-or to what extent-it harms those
who receive it.286 The CAN-SPAM Act accordingly provides for statu-
tory damages rather than requiring proof of actual injury in each
case.287 But the availability of statutory damages creates a risk that
private parties will sue even if they have not suffered any real harm.
With statutory damages linked to each illegal email,288 the price tag
can add up quickly. The Act responds to this risk by creating a limited
private right of action, available only to the providers of internet
access service. Enterprising plaintiffs have found ways to evade that
limitation, however, by creating domain names and providing email
service to friends and family and then letting the spam pile up.289 State
enforcement may offer a better solution. If citizens are truly bothered
by email spam, attorneys general will surely hear about it. States can
then use their own authority under the CAN-SPAM Act to seek dam-
ages or injunctive relief.290 Indeed, state enforcement may be particu-
larly valuable in areas like this, where federal law targets conduct that
creates uncertain or intangible harms. It is of course possible that state
attorneys general would exploit their enforcement authority in order
to obtain windfall recoveries for state treasuries or their own offices.
But given limited resources-and in the absence of a significant outcry
from the states' citizens-there is reason to doubt that such a strategy
would be politically productive.
285 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7701-13 (2006) and
18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2006)).
286 See Eric Goldman, Where's the Beef? Dissecting Spare's Purported Harms, 22 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 13, 13-14 (2003) (arguing that most purported harms
caused by e-mail spam are illusory, with actual harms adequately addressed by existing law
or market mechanisms).
287 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3) (2006) (providing for statutory damages of up to $25 or $100
per violation, depending on type of violation, with cap of $1,000,000).
288 See id. § 7706(g)(3)(A) (specifying that "each separately addressed unlawful message
that is transmitted or attempted to be transmitted over the facilities of the provider of
Internet access service, or that is transmitted or attempted to be transmitted to an elec-
tronic mail address obtained from the provider of Internet access service" is "a separate
violation").
289 See Amy E. Bivins, Marketing: Professional CAN-SPAM Plaintiff Again Falls Short
of Standing as "Adversely Affected" ISP, 15 ELEc. COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 375 (Mar. 10,
2010), available at 2010 WL 779922 (discussing dismissal of serial CAN-SPAM plaintiff's
suit for lack of standing).
290 See 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f) (authorizing states to sue for injunctive relief or recovery of
actual or statutory damages of up to $250 per violation, with maximum of $2,000,000).
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Finally, it bears emphasis that Congress can adopt measures that
further reduce the risk of overenforcement by states. The recent
Dodd-Frank act, for example, effectively precludes states from
pooling their resources in multistate actions by requiring that any
state enforcement action take place "in any district court of the
United States in that State or in a State court that is located in that state
and that has jurisdiction over the defendant."'291 Federal antitrust law
effectively precludes states from employing private attorneys on a
contingency fee basis by excluding from the definition of "State
attorney general" any person "employed or retained on a contingency
fee based on a percentage of the monetary relief awarded . "...92
Those measures-like the provisions for notice to and intervention by
the relevant federal agency, the prohibitions on state actions when a
federal action is pending, and the requirements that state enforcement
cases proceed in federal court-represent ways to cabin state enforce-
ment without squandering its benefits.
Other commentators have proposed more stringent controls on
state enforcement, such as requiring state enforcers to obtain pre-
approval from the relevant federal agency before undertaking an
enforcement action or enabling federal enforcers to effectively "veto"
state enforcement efforts.293 But many of the federalism-related bene-
fits of state enforcement outlined here would be lost if state enforce-
ment were limited to the class of cases that federal enforcers would
pursue. When viewed from the perspective of federalism, it becomes
clear that state enforcement of federal law offers systemic advantages
that go beyond coopting state resources into service of a federal
enforcement strategy. Much of the value of state enforcement lies in
the fact that state enforcers are likely to make different choices than
their federal counterparts-not because state attorneys general are
angels, but because their incentives and capabilities differentiate them
from the prototypical federal agency enforcers.294 States, moreover,
291 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1042(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2012-13 (2010) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5552) (emphasis added).
292 15 U.S.C. § 15g(1) (2006).
293 See DeBow, supra note 94, at 281 (arguing that Department of Justice "should
clearly be given the authority to move the court to dismiss [state antitrust suits] when the
department thinks that the interstate aspects of the litigation outweigh the in-state interests
asserted by the plaintiff state"); Rose, supra note 9, at 2225-26 (suggesting that federal
securities enforcer should be given authority "to invalidate state orders that it believes
conflict with the public interest" (citing John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the
SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 779-81 (2009)).
294 See Widman, supra note 9, at 212 ("[Olne need not see state attorneys general as
apolitical in order to champion concurrent state enforcement; one need only assume that
different political incentives apply to the federal and state governments and concurrent
enforcement thus ensures enforcement even when the regulated industry may strongly
lobby against it.").
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are not strangers to the federal rules they enforce. Scholars have
argued for decades that states have significant leverage in the federal
legislative process: these are the famous political safeguards of feder-
alism. 295 Enforcement authority confirms states' shared ownership of
federal rules, offering a hedge against the possibility that the federal
government will occupy the field legislatively or administratively and
then abdicate on enforcement. The Supreme Court recognized a sim-
ilar principle in Massachusetts v. EPA, where it emphasized preemp-
tion of state law as a reason to permit states to challenge a federal
agency's failure to regulate. 296 Yet courts have steadfastly refused to
give states and private parties the power to compel federal enforce-
ment.297 Direct enforcement authority operates as a form of self-help
for states, guaranteeing them a limited role in policy areas that are
otherwise dominated by the federal government.298
Concededly, the costs of interstate variations will in some cases
outweigh the benefits that can be derived from state participation in
enforcement. But concerns about disuniformity and overenforcement
should not be overstated or taken on blind faith. As this Section has
shown, such concerns have relatively little purchase in most of the
areas where state enforcement exists today. At the very least, policy
makers and commentators should recognize that state enforcement
can accomplish more than enhancing enforcement according to a fed-
eral plan, and should consider the values of federalism before
restricting state choice in the name of centralization and control.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to expose and explain the growing trend
of state enforcement of federal law. State enforcement cannot be
understood as a mere supplement to public enforcement by federal
295 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543
(1954) (emphasizing states' ability to protect their interests through federal political pro-
cess and thereby "influence the action of the national authority"); see also Kramer, supra
note 211 (updating and revising Wechsler's thesis).
296 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) ("When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sov-
ereign prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and
in some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle
emissions might well be pre-empted.").
297 See Stevenson, supra note 90, at 16-17 (discussing reluctance even to force federal
agency rulemaking).
298 See Widman, supra note 9, at 205 ("[A] state enforcement power allows for oversight
of those areas where an agency chooses not to prosecute a violation .... "). As Widman
explains, state enforcement authority may be significantly more attractive as a "fix" for
federal agency inaction than the alternative of expanded judicial review. See id. at 196-97,
201-02.
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agencies. Enforcement by state attorneys general is different from
federal enforcement in several important respects. It is unique, mixing
familiar features of public and private enforcement with others that
are distinctive to states.
Enforcement authority also is different from other forms of state
authority. Like state regulation, enforcement offers a way for states to
influence policy within their boundaries and nationwide. But enforce-
ment authority is both narrower and broader than regulatory
authority. It is narrower because states are limited to enforcing a fed-
eral law; it is broader because enforcement authority can exist in areas
where regulatory authority does not-or should not. Enforcement,
moreover, empowers state actors whose incentives and abilities distin-
guish them from other participants in the state-federal dialogue.
Understanding what state enforcement is is the first step to
assessing its proper place in the federal system. I have argued that
state enforcement can promote the goals of federalism by opening up
new opportunities for decentralized decision making outside of the
regulatory realm. Decentralization has both virtues and vices, and
state enforcement will be undesirable in circumstances where uni-
formity is critical in both law and enforcement. That limitation leaves
ample room for state enforcement of federal law, however, even in
areas where state law is preempted.
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